The 1968 Business Corporation Law of Louisiana by Miller, Ben R.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 29 | Number 3
April 1969
The 1968 Business Corporation Law of Louisiana
Ben R. Miller
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Ben R. Miller, The 1968 Business Corporation Law of Louisiana, 29 La. L. Rev. (1969)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol29/iss3/3
THE 1968 BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
OF LOUISIANA"
Ben R. Miller*
PREFACE
The Law Reform Committee of the Louisiana State Bar
Association in early 1962 interested the Honorable Wade 0. Mar-
tin, Jr., Secretary of State of Louisiana, in a project to revise the
corporation laws of Louisiana. The Committee recognized that
the laws were badly in need of revision; that there was gross
Louisiana income tax discrimination against a domestic cor-
poration doing a multi-state business; and that Louisiana was
losing its larger domestic multi-state corporations to other states,
and was gaining no such new ones, because of this tax inequity
and because our corporation laws did not meet the needs of
modern business corporations. Mr. Martin became very inter-
ested. A committee to draft proposed revisions of the Louisiana
Business Corporation Act and also of the Non-Profit Corpora-
tion Act and the Foreign Corporation Act was established. 2
The committee at the outset undertook to ascertain com-
ments and suggestions from the bar of Louisiana. A question-
naire was mailed to the then 4350 members of the Louisiana Bar
Association asking for comments as to the need for a revision
of these laws and suggestions for any changes they deemed
desirable. Seminars were held throughout the state3 for the
purpose of keeping the bar and the lay public abreast of the
committee's work and to secure comments and suggestions. The
research memoranda prepared by the Reporters were extremely
helpful to the committee-as were the voluminous reports of the
consultants to the "Joint Legislative Committee of the State of
1. This article has been adapted with the consent of the publisher, Claitor's
Book Store, from a chapter in a forthcoming book, containing forms as well, au-
thored by Ben R. Miller, Member of the Baton Rouge Bar.
* Member, Baton Rouge Bar.
2. Members of the Committee were: Wade 0. Martin, Jr., General Chairman;
Eberhard P. Deutsch, Chairman; Ben R. Miller, Vice-Chairman; Clarence L.
Yancey, and Joseph Onebane. Reporters: David W. Robertson and Mrs. Leila
Obier Cutshaw, Business Corporations; Robert N. Leavell, Foreign Corporations;
Dennis L. Rousseau, Non-Profit Corporations; and Ren6 H. Him~l, Jr., Coordina-
tion. Staff Coordinators: J. Thomas Jewell and Ashton J. Mouton; State Staff:
Chapman Sanford and C. C. Wood; Liaison with Louisiana Law Schools: Dean
Cecil Morgan and Robert N. Leavell of Tulane; David W. Robertson and Mrs.
Leila Obier Cutshaw of L.S.U.; and Dennis L. Rousseau of Loyola. Liaison with
Society of Louisiana Certified Public Accountants: Leo P. Michiels.
3. At Alexandria, Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, New Orleans, and Shreveport,
and at the annual convention of the Louisiana State Bar Association in April 1966.
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New York to Study Revisions of [its] Corporation Laws,"
(1956-61), and "The Joint Report of the New York State Bar
Association and the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York" (January 25, 1961) on the proposed revision of New
York's corporation laws.4 The committee in addition studied
others of the recent corporation statutory changes, particularly
those in Delaware, North Carolina, and Texas.
After thus seeking the views of the bar on reform of Lou-
isiana's corporation laws, the committee completed its task and
the proposed revisions were submitted to the 1968 legis-
lature. With but minor amendments-all acceptable to the com-
mittee-all were passed by an overwhelming vote of both
branches of the legislature, 5 as were two companion constitu-
tional amendments.6
The new Business Corporation Law appears as Louisiana R.S.
12:1-178, and is divided into seventeen parts.
PART I
Definitions
There are twenty-six terms defined in the opening section
of the new Business Corporation Law as compared to nineteen
in the prior statute. The more significant ones added are these:
The definition of "assets" makes it clear that "Treasury
Shares" are not considered an asset.
And "net assets," a term used in the new act, is not neces-
sarily equivalent to net book value of all assets: for example,
where the actual value of certain of the assets has fallen so far
below book value (cost less depreciation) that the directors
would not be justified in relying on book value of assets in deter-
mining whether a dividend could be paid.
The prior statute used the term "capital," "capital stock,"
and "surplus"; whereas the new statute uses the more realistic
and meaningful terms of "stated capital," "surplus," and "cap-
4. This material is on deposit with the Law Library at Louisiana State
University.
5. LA. R.S. 12:1-178 (Business Corporation Law) §§ 201-269 (Non-Profit
Corporation Law), and §§ 301-321 (Foreign Corporation Law) (Supp. 1968).
6. La. Acts 1968, No. 677, constitutional amendment to repeal LA. CONST.
art. XIII, § 1; La. Acts 1968; No. 678, to amend LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 7. Both
were adopted Nov. 1968.
7. LA. R.S. 12:1 (Supp. 1968); cf. La. Corp, Act of 1928, § 1.
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ital surplus" in order to clarify the law in regard to dividends
and other distributions to shareholders.
The new act employs the term, and defines, "stated capital"
to avoid the ambiguity which can arise from use of the terms
"capital" and "capital stock."
"Stated capital" is an accumulation of building blocks, so to
speak.
The first block in this assembly is the total amount re-
ceived for all issued par value stock, up to the total par value.8
The second block is the amount if any which may be allocated
by the board of directors or the shareholders to "stated capital"
from the excess over par value which may have been received
from the sale of issued par value stock 9 (unless so allocated to
"stated capital" such excess would go into "capital surplus").
The third block is that portion of the total amount received
from the sale of no par value stock1 ° which is not allocated by
the board of directors or the shareholders to "capital surplus." '
The fourth block is the amount, if any, which has been trans-
ferred by the board of directors to "stated capital" from "earned
surplus" or "capital surplus.
1 2
From this total there would be deducted:
(1) Any amounts transferred from "stated capital" to "cap-
ital surplus."' 3
(2) The amount of any distribution from "stated capital,"
such as in connection with the redemption and cancellation of
redeemable shares 4 or by the cancellation of other re-acquired
shares. 15
The prior act used merely the term "surplus" as the custo-
mary source for dividends; and defined it as "the excess of
assets over all liabilities plus capital stock." As the term "capital
stock" was ambiguous, the new act-as does the Model Act-
defines "surplus" more properly as "the excess of assets over
8. LA. R.S. 12:61A (Supp. 1968).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 61B.
13. Id. § 61C, which also imposes restrictions on doing so.
14. Id. §§ 61E, 55.
15. Id. § 55.
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liabilities plus stated capital." But more importantly, the new
act, as does the Model Act, uses two other terms: "capital sur-
plus" and "earned surplus." This is to clarify the law in regard
to dividends and other distributions to shareholders. "Capital
surplus" is all surplus that does not fall within the definition
of "earned surplus" and includes any amount arising from a
re-evaluation of assets to reflect the appreciation of actual
value over book value of assets. "Earned surplus" is defined
in the new act as "excess of surplus over capital surplus"; but
it may be generally described as the current balance of undis-
tributed net income from the time of organization. However,
because "capital surplus" can be applied by the board of direc-
tors to reduce or eliminate a deficit if there is no earned surplus,
the computation of earned surplus at any time after any such
application must have as its starting point the date capital sur-
plus was last so applied. Earned surplus, at any time, reflects
current profits and losses and is not necessarily a year-end
figure.
Earned surplus is one of the concepts employed in determin-
ing the right of a corporation to purchase its own shares; and
normally it would be from "earned surplus" that the board of
directors would declare dividends payable in cash or property.
The board of directors may transfer earned surplus to stated
capital or to capital surplus.
Capital surplus, as has been shown, may arise from the sale
of par value shares for more than par or from all allocations
thereto by the board or shareholders of any portion of the con-
sideration received for no par shares. It may also result from
a conversion of shares, or from a reduction of stated capital
or a transfer from earned surplus. It may be decreased by a con-
version of shares and by a distribution in partial liquidation
to shareholders. It may be used as a measure of the power of the
corporation to purchase its own shares when properly author-
ized, and to decrease or eliminate a deficit.
The term "reclassification of stock" in the new act means an
amendment of the articles so as to authorize a new class or series
of stock; or to change the authorized number of shares of an
original class or series; or to change par value stock to no par
value stock or vice versa, or increase or decrease par value; or
make or modify the rights or restrictions on shareholders-
including the cancellation or modification of accumulated but
[Vol. XXIX
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undeclared dividends-provided, of course, any such change
affecting rights of issued shares are made by whatever vote is
prescribed in the articles or in the statutes for such action.
The term "insolvency" is not defined in its bankruptcy
sense, but in its equity sense-as does the Model Act-"inability
of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in the usual
course of business." This affects the right of the corporation
to pay dividends or repurchase its stock. To illustrate the dif-
ference: a corporation may have a true "balance sheet" solvency
(show a "net asset" picture and hence not be "insolvent" in the
bankruptcy sense) and still be unable to "pay its debts as they
become due in the usual course of business."
PART II
Incorporation
Most other jurisdictions require-as did Louisiana's former
statute-three or more natural persons as incorporators. The
more recent statutes, however, particularly those of Delaware,
Iowa, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin,
permit a single natural person "21 years or older" to suffice
as incorporator. The research report which led to New York so
providing, read in part:
"More important than this demonstrated lack of reasons for
having three incorporators, is the fact that there are good
reasons to allow the use of just one man. The law to engender
respect should itself respect reality. This is especially true,
and does not import any sense of weakness, when no sub-
stantive policy of law argues to the contrary, as with incor-
porators. As stated by one qualified commentator 'If a single
individual is to own all the stock in the corporation, his sig-
nature to the charter and affidavit should be sufficient.
... This may seem to be a matter of no importance, but I
have a hunch that statutory insistence on meaningless red
tape may leave in the mind of the incorporated individual...
the notion that other, and more substantial requirements of
the corporation statutes are equally meaningless.' The same
thought was expressed by the revisors in Wisconsin when
they adopted the rule to allow one person to act as incorpor-
ator: 'The real parties in interest will more readily qualify
under this section if desired.' Further, there is no indica-
tion to date that the one-man rule, as adopted in Iowa, Ken-
1969]
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tucky and Michigan, beside Wisconsin, has had any ill
effects whatsoever. ' '16
The new Louisiana act goes beyond that of New York, how-
ever, by permitting "one or more natural or artificial persons
capable of contracting" to form a corporation. 7 This retains the
eligibility of emancipated minors as well as that of non-residents
of Louisiana.
18
The new act retains the broad enumeration of purposes for
which a corporation may be organized,1 9 and it also recognizes
the legislative authorization to law firms of incorporating for
tax purposes as a professional organization so as to have profit
sharing and pension plans.' 0
Substantial changes are effected in the new act with refer-
ence to the corporate name, and the reservation of a name. There
is no longer a requirement that the name end with either the
word (1) Corporation, or (2) Incorporated, or (3) Inc. It now
suffices if the name shall "contain" either of these; or contains
the word "Company" or the abbreviation "Co." if not imme-
diately preceded by the word "and" or the symbol ,,&.,,21 This is
in accordance with the modern trend of flexibility and it was
felt creditors would not be misled unduly into thinking they were
dealing with a partnership.
Although as a matter of courtesy the Secretary of State had
established an administrative procedure for a limited reserva-
tion of a corporate name, the new act establishes this as a right
of either a prospective domestic corporation or of a prospective
or existing foreign corporation; and for a maximum period of
60 days with two extensions permitted-presumably for not more
than 60 days for each extension. 2 A phone call to the Corpor-
ation Division of the Secretary of State's office will disclose if
16. Basic Research Memorandum No. 1 for the Committee on Revision of
Louisiana Corporation Laws 2.
17. LA. R.S. 12:21 (Supp. 1968). The corporate shield can still ,be pierced if
so used to be a mere "alter ego." Herbert v. Wiegand, 207 So.2d 882 (La.
4th Cir. 1968). See also Shreveport Sash & Door Co. v. Ray, 159 So.2d 434 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1963). Cf. David Moore Development Co. v. Higgins Industries, 163
So.2d 139 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
18. Most American jurisdictions do not require incorporators to be citizens or
residents of the incorporating state, although Idaho, Pennsylvania, Texas, South
Dakota, Vermont, Utah, and Washington either require all or some to be residents
of the state.
19. LA. R.S. 12:22 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 2.
20. As yet, among the professions only the medical and legal professions have
such statutes; and as yet the Internal Revenue Service does not recognize these.
21. LA. R.S. 12:23 (Supp. 1968), cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §4.
22. LA. R.S. 12:23 (Supp. 1968).
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a particular name is then available and if not what changes
would make it acceptable. Customarily the name can then be in-
formally reserved to allow time for a mail request for the
reservation of name to be made, or the articles to be filed.
The problem of "names" being taken out of commerce, so to
speak, though in fact unused, is handled in the new act as it
was in the prior statute by an express provision that a failure
to actively engage in business in this state for two years (and
the failure to file a Louisiana corporate franchise tax for two
years being prima facie evidence thereof) entitles the Secretary
of State to allow a name to be used by others.23
The problem of regulating the use of one's own surname in
a corporation competing with an established corporation hav-
ing the same surname in it, will probably still be present under
the new act, as it was under the prior ones.2 4
Although neither the Model Act nor the new New York act,
among others, has a requirement that the articles be in the
English language, this Louisiana requirement has been retained;
but significant changes, however, are made by the new act as
to the articles of incorporation.
2
1
Of particular interest to attorneys is that now the articles
may be by either an authentic act 26 or an act under private sig-
nature before two witnesses and thereafter acknowledged before
a notary public.
Illustrative of the policy of the committee to have fewer
rigid requirements in the statute, to accord greater flexibility,
and in general leave to the articles the matter of specific restric-
tions or limitations, the new act eliminates the need for "boiler
plate" provisions in the charter in order to cover all possible
objects and purposes; for the new act provides that the articles
of a corporation may simply state its purpose is "to engage in
any lawful activity for which corporations may be formed
under this chapter. ' 2 7
23. Id.; of. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 4B(2).
24. The problem is illustrated by Tharp-Bultman-Sontheimer Co. v. Tharp-
Sontheimer-Tharp, Inc., 147 La. 765, 85 So. 906 (1920).
25. LA. R.S. 12:24 (Supp. 1968).
26. For the benefit of any out-of-state reader, an authentic act is one executed
before a notary of this or any other state and two (other) witnesses. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2234; LA. R.S. 35:6 (Supp. 1968).
27. LA. R.S. 12:24B(2) (Supp. 1968). At present only a minority of states
permit this, but the new act is in accord with the modern trend.
1969]
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Some doubt has been expressed heretofore as to whether
a Louisiana corporation can have an indefinite duration until
dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily. The new act permits a
provision for perpetual duration 2 and the Louisiana Constitution
has been amended by the electorate to clearly validate such a
provision. 2
9
Other significant changes with respect to the articles are best
stated in the portions of the Comment to Section 24:
(1) The outmoded concept of assessable shares has been
discarded.
(2) The directors may be authorized to amend the articles
to fix the preferences, limitations and relative rights
of any class of stock, and to establish, and fix relative
rights and preferences as between series of preferred
or special shares.
(3) The requirement that paid-in capital be stated has
been eliminated as misleading. Since paid-in capital
can immediately be paid out again, such a requirement
provides only illusory protection to persons dealing
with the corporation. Inclusion of a statement of
paid-in capital is permissible though not required,
however; and Section 26 provides that if the articles
contain a statement of paid-in capital with which the
corporation will begin business, it may not engage
in business transactions until the stated capital has
been paid in.
(4) The location of the registered office, and names and
addresses of directors and registered agents, hereto-
fore stated in the articles, may now be stated in the
initial report filed with the articles. Sections 25A
and 101. The reason for this change is to retain in the
articles only information of a relatively permanent
nature.
(5) Shareholders will hereafter have preemptive rights
only to the extent, if any, that they are expressly pro-
28. LA. R.S. 12:24B(3) (Supp. 1968), validated by La. Acts 1968, No. 678,
LA. CONST. amend. No. 10, adopted November 5, 1968.
29. La. Acts 1968, No. 678, LA. CONST. amend. No. 10, adopted November 5,
1968. Lake Superior Piling Co. v. Stevens, 60 So.2d 221 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952),
illustrates the problem and the need for such a change.
[Vol. XXIX
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
vided in the articles. See Section 72 for the meaning
of a provision in the articles that 'Shareholders shall
have preemptive rights.'
(6) Subsection C(3) authorizes insertion in the articles
of appropriate provision for reversion to the corpor-
ation of unclaimed dividends and reclassification
shares, which would otherwise be unproductive and
possibly subject to the escheat.
(7) Subsection C (4) continues in effect the liberal policy
of the former law, permitting all such deviations from
'normal' corporate rules and procedures as are not
expressly prohibited by law. Such provisions could in-
clude a requirement that any specific corporate action
be taken by a higher vote than that required by law
or by a specified class vote. Authorization for inclu-
sion of such provisions in the articles does not pre-
clude their valid inclusion in an agreement among the
shareholders. (See Section 29.)
One of the most significant changes effected by the new act
was to establish the Office of the Secretary of State as a cen-
tral place of recordation of all corporate documents, and to have
corporate existence begin retroactively 3o with the date of execu-
tion of the articles if filed within three days thereof (exclusive
of legal holidays) -otherwise as of the time of filing with the
Secretary of State. And pre-filing is possible now-so as to have
an exact hour or even minute known in advance as the begin-
ning of corporate existence. 31 Local filing was preserved, but to
be subsequently and not initially, and with a failure or over-
sight not to create any real problem. It is surprising, but a fact,
that under the former law a sizable number of charters never
reached the office of the Secretary of State.
The new act eliminates the requirement of a minimum "paid
in capital" of $1000 as a requisite for commencement of busi-
ness; and provides instead that only if the articles provide
a minimum paid in capital, must it be paid as a condition
precedent to beginning business. A bare majority of the states
have no requirement of a statutory minimum paid in capital. In
30. This provision was for the purpose of preventing incorporators from being
held personally liable for corporate obligations created-as is so often found neces-
sary-simultaneously with executing the articles and before those articles can be
actually filed. Southland Rentals, Inc. v. Scott Walker, 147 So.2d 73 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962) imposed such liability under the prior statute.
31. LA. R.S. 12:25 (Supp. 1968).
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the states which do require such a minimum, it ranges from $500
in Georgia to $1000 as under our former statute.3 2 The committee
which drafted this new act agreed with those who drafted the
new New York statute that such a requirement as was in our old
statute was archaic; and, moreover, might "impose unwarranted
and unlooked for hazards and liabilities upon organizers of
business, if for whatever reason the amounts are not paid in
or are only partially or informally paid in." 3 A requirement
that $1000 of capital be paid in before commencing business
gives the illusory protection to third persons; as it could be,
and often was, immediately withdrawn or spent on organization
expense.
The new act reverses the statutory policy as to the authority
to make and alter by-laws. Instead of requiring that the articles
authorize directors to do this, that power in the board is
implicit if not denied by the articles; but as under the prior
statute shareholders may always "change or repeal any by-laws
so made." The implicit authority to directors to make and alter
by-laws includes those affecting their own offices, subject, how-
ever, to certain restrictions.3 4
This is perhaps a middle position between the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act provision which vests power in the Board
unless reserved in the articles to the shareholders,3 5 (which
would appear to deny even shareholder right to repeal or amend
unless so provided in the articles) and those states which, as
under Louisiana's former statute, gave no authorization to the
directors as to by-laws except as granted in the articles.3 6
The Louisiana Supreme Court held in 194031 that when the
board has the power to adopt by-laws it can also waive them;
but that when the power to make or alter by-laws is exclusively
vested in the stockholders, neither the board nor the officers
can waive those made by the shareholders.
Although permissible under the prior statute, the new Act,
in Section 29, recognizes the expanded development in recent
32. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 51, at 184-85 (1960).
33. Research Outline Analysis 3.05, by Robert S. Lesher, Consultant, to the
Joint (N.Y.) Legislative Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws.
34. LA. R.S. 12:28A (Supp. 1968).
35. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 25 (1960).
36. Id. § 25, 2.02(3) (b), at 418.
37. Hill v. American Co-operative Ass'n, 195 La. 590, 197 So. 241 (1940).
[Vol. XXIX
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
years of a contractual arrangement known as a "Shareholder
Agreement. 381 The Comment to that section reads:
"This section makes it clear that any lawful provision, re-
gardless of its conformity to 'normal' corporate rules and
practice, may validly be set forth in a shareholders' agree-
ment, if not required to be set forth in the articles. The
certificates of stock must contain a reference to any such
agreement. See R.S. 12 :57F. The requirements of this Sec-
tion and of R.S. 12:57 do not preclude the validity, as among
the parties signatory thereto only, of an agreement which
does not meet those requirements."
To affect third persons a duplicate original must also be
available for inspection at the registered office if not included
in the articles.
The full import of this section must await the extent of its
utilization and judicial determination.
In 1961 a Federal District Court in Louisiana had these facts
before it :3 9 Certain experts in oil exploration were employed
by a newly reorganized Delaware Corporation which was to and
did go public; they were given stock valued at about $75,000
for stock in a corporation which was a party to the reorganiza-
tion worth but some $5000. In return, however, they executed
a stock transfer restriction agreement that if they left the com-
pany voluntarily or were discharged for cause, the shareholders
would sell their stock back to the company for a fixed low price
per share. The court held this agreement was not contra bono
mores under Louisiana law, as it was supported by valid con-
sideration and was not "immoral."
There are pertinent decisions in other jurisdictions, too,
including one from New York 40 but which New York decision
38. Law Review notes and articles discussing such protective agreements, so
often important in close corporations, include these: Notes, 72 HARV. L. REV. 555
(1959) ; 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961); O'Neal, Arrangements Which Protect
Minority Shareholders Against "Squeeze-Outs", 45 MINN. L. REV. 537 (1961). See
also 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 244 (1958).
39. Georesearch, Inc. v. Morriss, 193 F.Supp 163 (W.D. La. 1961), affirmed,
298 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1962).
40. Benitendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), as
summarized in 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 25, 3.05, at 423-24
(1960). The court there considered the validity of the following unanimously
adopted shareholder by-laws that: "(1) Shareholders should not act except by
unanimous vote; (2) Directors should not be selected except by unanimous vote;
(3) Directors should not act except by unanimous vote; and (4) by-laws should
not be amended except by unanimous vote of the shareholders. In a 4-3 decision,
the first and second by-laws were held invalid on the ground that they contravened
statutes which required less than unanimity for the election of directors and
various other -types of shareholder action. The third by-law was also held invalid
19691
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is believed to be disapproved by, and would not be the rule
under, Louisiana's new statute; and one from New Jersey.41
Such a shareholder agreement will enable matters of primary
personal concern (such as buy or sell agreements among those
in a closely held corporation) to be binding without the necessity
of public recordation.
As to any stock which is community property, the husband's
signature on a shareholder agreement would not, however,
bind the wife or her personal representative in event of separa-
tion, divorce, or death." Even by executing the agreement she
could not bind herself or her personal representative to sell her
community interest to her husband, for under Louisiana law
the spouses may not "contract" with each other during mar-
riage43 It may well be, however, that if the wife executes such
an agreement obligating her or her personal representative to
sell her community interest to the corporation or to stockholders
other than her husband, this would be enforceable. And care-
fully drawn charter provision might be enforceable against a
wife even in favor of her husband.
The care with which such agreements must be drawn is
illustrated by a 1964 decision of a Louisiana appellate court.4 4
PART III
Amendments and Restatement of Articles
The new act reduces the statutory requirement (in the ab-
sence of the articles providing a smaller vote-not less, however,
on the ground that it conflicted with the statutory scheme of corporate manage-
ment which contemplated majority vote of directors based on one-third to majority
quorum. The fourth by-law however, was upheld because it did not contravene any
statute. The majority of the court indicated that even if such provisions had been
in the articles of incorporation the result would have been the same, and refused to
enforce the invalid by-laws as a shareholders' agreement. The dissenting judges
agreed that the first two by-laws were invalid as by-laws (but contended that they
could be enforced as a shareholders' agreement), contended that the third by-law
came within express statutory exceptions and should have been upheld, and
agreed that the fourth by-law was valid."
41. Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (1953), as summarized
in 1 ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 3.01 at 489 (1960), having
before it a shareholders' agreement which specified that no 'binding action could be
taken by shareholders or directors of a New York close corporation unless share-
holders representing ninety percent of the stock voted in favor of such action, held
the restriction valid; and a by-law in conformity therewith was also held lawful
on common law principles.
42. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956).
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1790.
44. Phillips v. Newland, 166 So.2d 357 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ; cf. Menke
v. Gold Metal Oil Co., 47 Ohio App. 180, 191 N.E. 472 (1933), which held invalid
a shareholder agreement which under the new Louisiana statute would probably
have been valid.
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than a majority present) from two-thirds the total voting
power, 45 to "two-thirds of the voting power present. ' 46 As in
prior law, if an amendment would adversely affect the rights
of a class or series there must be concurrence by that class or
series but by only two-thirds of the voting power of that class
or series present-rather than of the total outstanding.47 The
new act, moreover, expressly defines and limits what would thus
"adversely affect" a class or series:
"Except as otherwise provided in the articles, the rights of
a shareholder shall not be considered adversely affected
unless the amendment (otherwise than as permitted by the
articles) (a) alters or abolishes any preferential right of
his shares having preferences, (b) creates, alters or abolishes
any right in respect of redemption of his shares, (c) alters
or abolishes any preemptive right in respect of his shares,
(d) creates or alters (other than to abolish) any restriction
on transfer applicable to his shares, (e) excludes or limits
his right as a shareholder to vote on a matter, except as
such right may be limited by voting rights or new shares
then being authorized of an existing or new class, or (f)
alters or abolishes any right of his shares to receive divi-
dends, except as such right may be affected by dividend
rights of new shares then being authorized of an existing
or new class. ' '4 s
The new act makes it clear that if appropriate notice of the
proposal has been given, amendments may be made at annual
meetings of stockholders, and not merely at special meetings
"duly called upon notice for the specific purpose.' 4 9
The provision in the former statute permitting an amend-
ment to extend the life of a corporation even after its duration
as fixed in the articles may have expired is retained; but with
the proviso that if by then the original name is no longer avail-
able there must be a name change. 0 For corporations organized
45. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 42; Blum v. Latter, 163 So.2d 189 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964) cert. denied, 246 La. 717, 167 So.2d 301 (1964).
46. LA. R.S. 12:31B (Supp. 1968). As submitted to the legislature a bare
majority of the voting power present would have sufficed in the absence of the
articles requiring more, but it was amended.
47. LA. R.S. 12:31C (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 42C.
48. LA. R.S. 12:31C (Supp. 1968).
49. Id. § 31B; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 42A. Compare LA. R.S. 12:42
(1950) with LA. R.S. 12:31B (Supp. 1968). See also 2 ABA-ALI MODF.L BUS.
Cozi. ACT ANN. § 59 (1960).
50. LA. R.S. 12:31D (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 42E.
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under the new act which take advantage of the authorization
for indefinite duration, this problem will not arise.
As with the articles and contrary to the procedure under the
prior statute, amendments are filed first with the Secretary of
State and thereafter with the Recorder of Mortgages of the
Parish where the corporation maintains its registered office;
amendments may also be prefiled; and may likewise be by
private act duly acknowledged, as well as by an authentic act.51
The prior statute required the act of amendment to be
executed "by such person or persons as the shareholders may
have directed," and that there be annexed a "full copy of the
minutes of the meeting" certified as a true copy by the secre-
tary of the corporation. 52 The new statute permits the act of
amendment to be executed "in the corporation's name by the
president or a vice president or any other person thereto
authorized by resolution or consent of the shareholders, and by
the secretary or the treasurer or by any assistant secretary or
assistant treasurer. ' '53 (Emphasis added.) If not executed by
either the president or a vice president, a copy of the resolution
or consent for the amendment, certified by a secretary or an
assistant secretary as a true copy, must be annexed.54
Although the new act does not expressly state-as did the
former statute-that an amendment may be authorized by unani-
mous action of shareholders without a formal meeting,5 5 it is
clear that this method was retained and even broadened.5 6
The new act makes certain provision for automatic or ipso
facto amendments. In a merger, "the articles of the surviving
business corporation shall be deemed amended to the extent
of any changes therein stated in the merger agreement. '57 Fur-
ther, the new act provides that:
(1) Where subscription rights, warrants, stock options
or conversion privileges are outstanding and there is not
sufficient treasury stock available therefor, if the grant or
issuance thereof had been authorized by such vote of the
51. LA. R.S. 12:32B-32C (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 43B-
43C.
52. LA. R.S. 12:43A (1950).
53. LA. R.S. 12:32A (Supp. 1968).
54. Id. § 32.
55. Id.; of. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §43. But see In the Matter of Louisiana
Inv. & Loan Corp., 224 F. Supp, 274, nl (E.D. La. 1963).
56. LA. R.S. 12:76 (Supp. 1968).
57. Id. § 115F.
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shareholders as would have sufficed to amend the articles
to effect the necessary increase in such stock, the articles
shall "be deemed amended to increase the authorized num-
ber of shares of the class involved' ;58
(2) Should the articles provide that cancelled stock
may not be reissued, and the cancelled stock had been shares
which had been converted into other stock, the articles shall
be deemed amended to reduce the authorized capital stock by
the number of shares so cancelled."59
Although the proper officers are required to "forthwith"
execute and file appropriate formal articles of such an amend-
ment, omission to do so "shall not derogate from the effective-
ness of such automatic amendments.6 0
If an amendment is to effect a reclassification of stock
(which the new act permits with much more flexibility than the
prior statute), it must state the number of shares, and par
value of par value stock; the number of shares of no-par stock;
and detailed information as to any classes or series of stock,
rights, and preference; and the extent of the board's authority
to modify or vary any rights between them.61
The new act provides in much clearer and concise language
the very worthwhile device which permits a corporation whose
articles have been often amended, to restate them, giving effect
to all prior amendments.6
2
PART IV
Corporate Powers
One of the most significant changes effected by the new
statute was to unshackle corporations and give them such busi-
ness "powers" as would be possessed by a natural person unless
limited by the articles. There are of course certain restrictions
on the "rights" of both an artificial person (corporation) and
a natural person in the exercise of business; but it can lead to
undesired results to restrict-as did our former statute-the
power of such an artificial person to a much greater extent than
its natural person business competitor. Under the new statute,63
58. Id. § 33B.
59. Id. § 33C, § 56E.
60. Id. § 33E.
61. Id. § 54.
62. Id. § 34; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 72.
63. LA. R.S. 12:41 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 12.
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therefore, unless restricted by its charter, a corporation may do
such things as deal in governmental securities, guarantee the
obligation of others ;64 provide indemnity and insurance of or
for its officers, directors, employees, and agents; establish
employee benefit plans; and even shift from one type of opera-
tion to completely different and unrelated ones. 65 Further, any
doubt as to the power of a corporation to enter into partner-
ships or joint ventures,66 or to acquire and hold real estate for
an indefinite time and even unrelated to whatever may be its
existing or contemplated operations,6 7 or to have indefinite or
perpetual existence,68 are now eliminated. The new act specif-
ically authorizes donations by corporations for the public wel-
fare, or for charitable, scientific, educational, or civic pur-
poses, thus repealing by implication at least the provisions of
an act of the Legislature of 1954 which had authorized cor-
porate donation only as to a "corporation, trust, fund or founda-
64. LA. R.S. 12:41B (Supp. 1968). This is far different from the jurispru-
dential rule here in 1909, typified by the decision in Robert Gair Co. v. Columbia
Rice Packing Co., 124 La. 193, 50 So. 8 (1909). The court quoted from an 1899 de-
cision of our Supreme Court, that: "Implied powers, in corporations, are presumed
to exist only to the extent that may be necessary to enable such bodies to carry
out the express powers granted, and to accomplish the purpose of their creation;
and an incidental power may be defined to be one that is directly and immediately
appropriate to the execution of the specific power granted, and not one that has
merely some slight or remote relation to it." The charter involved stated the "object
and purposes" to be erection and operation of a rice mill and in connection with
that "to buy and sell real estate, livestock, and all articles and commodities that
such corporations are authorized to deal in under the statutes of the state." The
charter also contained broad language: "and generally shall possess all the powers
and privileges that corporations are or may be lawfully authorized to possess within
the state." A guaranty of this corporation of a contract by an "independent" rice
packing company was held ultra vires-though the shareholders of the milling cor-
poration were also the shareholders of the packing corporation.
65. LA. R.S. 12:41B (9), (11) (Supp. 1968).
66. Id. § 12:4113 (5) & (6). For the jurisprudence under the prior statute:
Pfeiffer v. Hemisphere International Corp., 153 So.2d 467 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963) ; of. Note 25 TuL. L. REv. 272-75 (1951) ; J. Mestier & Co. v. Chevalier
Pavement Co., 109 La. 562, 32 So. 520 (1901) ; George Advertising Simms Co. v.
Orleans Metal Bed Co., 5 Orl. App. 253 (La. App. 1908).
A partnership "in commendam" has been defined in Louisiana's Civil Code
since its first Civil Code of 1808, substantially as currently defined in art. 2839:
"Partnership in commendam is formed by a contract, 'by which one person or
partnership agrees to furnish another person or partnership a certain amount,
either in property or money, to be employed by the person or partnership to whom
it is furnished, in his or their own name or firm, on condition of receiving a share
in the profits, in the proportion determined by the contract, and of being liable to
losses and expenses to the amount furnished and no more."
The 1.968 legislature by Act 304, added this additional paragraph to LA. CiV.
CODE art. 2829:
"A partnership may have one or more partners in commendam who may be
natural persons, partnerships or corporations, domestic or foreign, or formed under
the laws of the United States, provided that at least one natural person, partner-
ship or corporation act as an ordinary or commercial partner of the partnership."
67. LA. CONST. amend. No. 11, adopted November 5, 1968.
68. LA. CONST. amend. No. 10, adopted November 5, 1968.
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tion ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, char-
itable or educational purposes" and which were moreover sub-
ject to certain further restrictions.6 9
But a long standing though as yet unpoliced and unenforced
statute providing that no domestic corporation or foreign cor-
poration engaged in business in Louisiana "shall directly or
indirectly contribute, donate or lend any of its funds or prop-
erty" to promote or advocate any political issue, party or can-
didate,70 would appear to remain in effect.
Coupled with these changes in corporation "power" there
are important changes with respect to the "ultra vires" doc-
trine. Consummated transactions cannot be set aside. And causes
of action founded on ultra vires acts are limited to civil actions
for damages or injunction; or action by the state to enjoin or
dissolve a domestic corporation or revoke the certificate of
authority of a foreign corporation. The new act, moreover,
contains a provision that a shareholder claiming an act was
"ultra vires" has the burden of proving that "he has not at any
time prior thereto assented to the act, conveyance or transfer
in question, and that in bringing the action he is not acting
in collusion with the officials of the corporation."'1
The new act also permits relief, when otherwise appropriate,
from ultra vires Louisiana real estate transactions by foreign
corporations. 72
PART V
Shares
The new act retains the flexible provisions authorizing
shares to be issued in fractions; and to be divided into classes,
with optional or conversion rights. The new act adds authority
to issue scrip in lieu of fractional shares. This is in accord with
69. LA. R.S. 12:41(12) (Supp. 1968), implied repealing Act 638 of 1954, in-
corporated as R.S. 9:2280. At common law gifts by business corporations were re-
quired to fall within the express or clearly implied power of the corporation. The
early judicial decisions required a showing of a definite and "business" benefit to
the corporation or otherwise be held "ultra vires." Judicial liberality, however, soon
sustained donations to charity as a "social obligation" in a sense due by, and in
any event permitted to, the corporate citizens. Texas became the first state, in 1917,
to recognize by indirection in its statute the right of corporations to make dona-
tions for charitable and similar purposes. When the Internal Revenue Service in
1936 first expressly permitted their deductions from taxable income, the states gen-
erally so amended their statutes and now all but a few specifically authorize
certain corporate donations. 1 ALl MODEL Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. § 4(m), at 138
(1960).
70. La. Acts 1915 (1st E.S.), No. 20; LA. R.S. 18:1482-1496 (1950).
71. LA. R.S. 12:42A(1) (Supp. 1968).
72. Id. § 42B.
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most jurisdictions which have revised their statutes in recent
years. Most of these other statutes, however, give voting rights to
the holders of fractional shares while denying voting rights to
scrip holders.7 3 The new Louisiana statute74 continues to deny
voting rights to fractional shares and to scrip as well.
The prior statute through the use of two terms in its sec-
tions treating with the consideration and payment for shares,
possibly created an ambiguity.7 It spoke of "allotment" of shares
and also of "subscription" for shares. The new act 76 follows the
Model Act 77 very closely in this respect and avoids the ambi-
guity; for the new statute speaks only of the "issuance" of
shares and the "consideration" therefor.
As under the former statute, shares with no par value may
be issued for the consideration expressed in dollars determined
by the board unless the articles have reserved that power to the
shareholders.78 When the power to fix the price of no-par stock
is so reserved to the shareholders, the new act expressly states
a majority of the voting power present suffices, whereas the
former statute was ambiguous on this point too.7 9
Under the new act, in contrast to the prior one, it would ap-
pear that the issuance of stock based on a valuation placed by
the directors or shareholders on property given in exchange
cannot be rescinded because of over-valuationsO But an officer,
director, or shareholder, as the case might be, who "without
the exercise of reasonable care and inquiry" consented or
voted therefor, incurs civil liability to the corporation for the
benefit of creditors or shareholders for the loss or damage.
To impose this liability there must have been "gross over-
73. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See 1
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., § 22, at 373-78 (1960).
74. LA. R.S. 12:51D (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 13D.
75. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 15, 16, 17.
76. LA. R.S. 12:52 (Supp. 1968).
77. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 17, at 301 (1960).
78. LA. R.S. 12:52 (Supp. 1968) ; of. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 13A, 13B, 15.
79. LA. R.S. 12:52A (Supp. 1968).
80. Compare LA. R.S. 12:53D (Supp. 1968) with La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 15.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Johnson v. National Sand & Gravel Co., 172 La.
388, 134 So. 369 (1931), held that a resolution of the board authorizing the pur-
chase of specific property for a specific amount of corporate stock was of itself a
sufficient "appraisement" by the board of its value as the statute prescribed no
specific "form" of "appraisal"; and that the corporation's failure to file with the
Secretary of State and with the recorder the description and the appraisal of the
property taken in exchange for stock did not prejudice that stockholder's rights-as
this section of the statute was "purely directory."
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valuation," although proof of fraud is not a prerequisite.8 1 The
subscriber's own liability for civil damages, however, is condi-
tioned on proof of "fraud. '8 2
Since "fraud" is essential to a recovery of an excess gross
over-valuation from the subscriber, it would seem that the appli-
cable prescriptive period (limitations) to that action would be
one year ;83 but since officers and directors occupy a fiduciary
relation to the corporation and its shareholders it would appear
that the applicable prescription (limitations) to an action
against them would be ten years.8 4
Under the Model Act treasury shares could only be sold
for a consideration expressed in dollars but which may be for
property or services.8 5 The prior Louisiana statute was in ac-
cord, as is the new statute.8 6 Under the prior statute, however,
stock repurchased by the corporation could not be sold for less
than the purchase price, 87 but this restriction is not in the new
statute. It should perhaps be noted that state banks are pro-
hibited from having treasury stock except such as may have
been acquired by virtue of execution against or forfeiture by
a debtor and the bank must then dispose of it in a relatively short
period and only for a money consideration.88
The outmoded concept of "assessable shares" has been dis-
carded 9
A problem many attorneys have been concerned with is what
happens when a corporation does not have the shares with
which to meet the call of those having conversion and option
rights. No doubt an action would lie for damages but the
measure of the damages may be difficult. The new statute meets
this problem in two effective and unique ways: the articles
"shall be deemed amended to increase the authorized number
of shares of the class involved," as required to meet such
calls ;80 and it points up affirmatively the duty of the officers
81. LA. R.S. 12:52D, 92C, 93C (Supp. 1968); cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928,§§ 19, 20.
82. LA. R.S. 12:95 (Supp. 1968).
83. Smalley v. Bernstein, 165 La. 1, 115 So. 347 (1928).
84. LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968) ; Dawkins v. Mitchell, 149 La. 1038, 90 So.
396 (1922).
85. 1 ABA-ALI MODFL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 17, at 317-20 (1960).
86. Compare LA. R.S. 12:52A (Supp. 1968) with La. Corp. Act of 1928,
§§ 15, 23C.
87. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 23C.
88. LA. R.S. 6:245 (Supp. 1968).
89. See LA. R.S. 12:24, 52 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 14(6).
90. LA. R.S. 12:33B (Supp. 1968).
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and directors to reserve sufficient shares with which to meet
all such commitment obligations.91 This first provision was
adopted from the California statute.9 2 The prior statute was
silent on the problem. It is of interest to note that the report
of the New York Joint Legislative Committee had recommended
to its legislature that the grant of stock options be limited to
25% of the authorized shares; and that provisions be made
requiring a reservation of an adequate number of shares to
meet the commitments. New York, however, failed to adopt
either suggestion.9
3
The provisions in the new act relating to reclassification
of stock make some significant changes from the prior statute
and clarify other provisions.
By a "reclassification of stock" amendment permitted by the
new statute a corporation has great flexibility to meet chang-
ing conditions, and may :' 4
(1) Change the authorized number of shares;
(2) Authorize shares of a new class;
(3) Change the par value of par value stock;
(4) Change from par value to no par, or vice versa;
(5) Change the preferences, limitations, or relative rights
of existing issues or authorized shares;
(6) Cancel or modify the right of existing shares to accum-
ulated but undeclared dividends;
(7) Cancel any issue shares in connection with a reduction
in numbers.
These provisions generally accord with the Model Act and
the more recent statutes.9' The prior Louisiana statute permitted
some, but not all, these changes to be made. 6
Tax consequences often dictate some reclassification of its
stock by a corporation as, for example, to avoid a burdensome
91. Id. § 53.
92. CALIF. CODE ANN. § 1103 (Deering 1962).
93. Basic Research Memorandum 20, for the Committee on Revision of Lou-
isiana Corporation Laws 4-6 (1964).
94. LA. R.S. 12:1(p) (Supp. 1968).
95. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 53, at 196-211 (1960).
96. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 42, 44. For example, Louisiana, under its prior
statute was but one of 15 states which did not expressly authorize an amendment
to increase or decrease the par value of its stock. Nor did the prior statute permit
the cancellation or modification of an accumulated dividend.
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and unrealistic franchise tax where there has been a real deple-
tion in true assets, and accordingly of the true value of its "par
value" stock.9 7 Safeguards against using this device unfairly
are built in. Stated capital remains unchanged except that con-
current transfers between stated capital and surplus may be
made to the extent permitted by Section 6. The aggregate allocat-
ed value of issued shares may not exceed the amount of such
stated capital. Procedural requirements for an amendment to
"reclassify" the stock to these various ends have been discussed
previously.98
The redemption, purchase, and cancellation of shares had
been dealt with in two sections of the prior statute,99 but are
covered by one section of the new act.100 In determining whether
to retain any redeemed or purchased shares as "treasury shares"
rather than cancelling them, the franchise tax and other- impli-
cations should be considered. 1°1
Under the prior statute there were several restrictions on
the right of a corporation to purchase or redeem shares even
though there was a surplus available for such a purchase or
redemption.' 02 The new act permits purchases and redemption
out of unreserved surplus and without stockholder approval, for
any purpose and with no restriction provided only (1) the price
paid does not exceed the redemption price if one had been
stated, and (2) shares having a preferential right in event of
liquidation are not prejudiced. This broad power is perhaps
susceptible of abuse, but it is believed the courts could prevent
gross inequities.
The new statute has devices whereby "surplus" may be
increased and thus facilitate share purchases or redemption:
97. State v. Louisiana Navigation & Fisheries Co., 8 So.2d 796 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1942) illustrates the necessity of full compliance with the procedural re-
quirements.
98. LA. R.S. 12:31, 32, 33 (Supp. 1968). See page ...... supra.
99. La. Corp. Act. of 1928, §§ 23, 45.
100. LA. R.S. 12:55 (Supp. 1968).
101. State of Louisiana v. Stewart Bros. Cotton Co., 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317
(1939).
102. In Georesearch, Inc. v. Morriss, 193 F.Supp. 163 (W.D. La. 1961), af-
firmed, 298 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1962), the court construed a Delaware statutory
provision that a repurchase of shares could not be made if there would result "any
impairment of the capital of the corporation." The court held this did not limit
repurchase only from an earned surplus, for there was a "capital surplus" avail-
able. This would be permitted under the new Louisiana act. In Jackson v. Cola-
grossi, 50 Wash.2d 572, 574, 313 P.2d 697, 699 (1957) the Washington statute
prohibited a repurchase if it would "cause any impairment of the capital stock of
the corporation"-and the Washington court said this meant the repurchase could
only be from earned surplus.
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(1) by transfers from stated capital to surplus ;103 or (2) by a
re-evaluation of assets so as to increase surplus.104
Where no surplus is available, a purchase or redemption
may be made from stated capital provided (a) the corporation
is not, nor would it thereby be made, insolvent; (b) shares hav-
ing a preferential right in event of liquidation would not be
prejudiced; and (c) stated capital would not be reduced below
the aggregate allocated value of the remaining issued shares.
But unless two-thirds in interest of each class has approved, a
purchase or redemption out of stated capital must be for the
purpose of :105
(1) redeeming and cancelling stock which is subject to re-
demption;
(2) paying dissenting stockholders entitled to payment, 10 6
in which event such shares are likewise to be cancelled;
(3) eliminating fractions of shares, or to collect or com-
promise a debt to the corporation.
The prior statute had more restrictions and accorded less flex-
ibility.
Convertible shares are shares which may be converted into
another form of securities of the corporation. Issuance of conver-
tible shares as additional consideration for loans to the cor-
poration is sometimes advisable. And a corporation might find
it helpful in attracting or retaining key personnel to offer them
"rights" to convert less costly or attractive shares of the corpor-
ation into more valuable or attractive securities, in addition
to granting them options to buy shares of the corporation at an
attractive price.
The prior statute permitted the issuance of conversion
rights and "the right or option to purchase" only "in connection
with the issuance and sale" of any stock or securities to the
grantee. The new statute eliminates this restriction or limita-
tion.10 7 Under the new statute, therefore, conversion rights and
stock options can be given independently of the sale of shares
103. LA. R.S. 12:61 (Supp. 1968).
104. Id. § 61.
105. Id. § 55.
106. Where there has been a sale, lease or exchange of all assets, or a merger
or consolidation with less than a 90% subsidiary, and at least 80% of the stock-
holders had not approved. Id. §§ 112, 121, 131.
107. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 24.
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or securities. If the optionee is not a director and does not own
or control as much as 10 % of the voting power of the corpora-
tion, a two-thirds vote of the directors may grant such right-
otherwise the grant must be authorized or approved by the
shareholders. 1°0 Shareholder approval is in fact one of the pre-
requisites to attain the tax benefits of option grants to em-
ployees. 1° 9
Although some statutes which permit the granting of such
"rights" limit the period within which the "rights" may be
exercised, the new statute does not-nor did the prior statute,
and neither does the Model Act, or the recent New York stat-
ute.1 0 There can of course be an abuse of an "unlimited" grant
but the drafters of the new statute considered that the require-
ment of shareholder approval if the grantee was a director or
controlled as much as 10 % of the voting power, was sufficient
protection to justify this flexibility.
PART VI
Capital, Surplus, Dividends
Significant changes have been made with respect to capital,
surplus, and dividends.1 Unless the shareholders had made the
original allocation to stated capital of the excess over par
received from sale of par value stocks, or the allocation between
stated capital and capital surplus of the price received for no-
par stock, the board itself may make reallocations or transfers
between capital and surplus as long as no deficit is created
and sufficient stated capital remains to cover the issued par
value shares and any liquidation preference. And such realloca-
tions and transfers no longer have to be placed of record with
the Secretary of State or Recorder of Mortgages.
Under the prior statute, unless the charter expressly pro-
vided otherwise, before using net profits from "wasting assets"
(such as from oil wells, patents, or leases) there had to be a
deduction for depletion.112 But pursuant to the general approach
of granting broad statutory authority unless denied by the
108. LA. R.S. 12:56A (Supp. 1968). This follows the Model Act (Section
18A) and the most recent statutes.
109. 26 U.S.C. §§ 421-425, as last amended and added by Pub. L. 88-272, Title
II, § 221(a), Feb. 26, 1964, 78 Stat. 71.
110. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Conp. ACT ANN. § 18A, at 339-40 (1960).
111. LA. R.S. 12:61, 62, 63 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 25,
26, 45, 46.
112. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 26G.
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articles, a corporation is not now obligated to make such a
deduction unless required by the articles. 113 And rather than
making a statutory enumeration of the type of asset values
which were to be excluded from "surplus" (unrealized appre-
ciation or unaccrued or unearned profits on accounts of notes
receivable, for example) the new statute leaves to the board
this determination, unless denied by the articles.
1 1 4
Shareholder approval for the payment of dividends out of
surplus is not required under the new act.11 5 And dividends may
be paid out of net profits if there is no surplus provided liquida-
tion preferences are not impaired and there is not or will not
be a deficit or insolvency.11
The general shape of the provisions in the new statute relat-
ing to capital, surplus, and dividends is to set forth three
classes of capital accounts: stated capital, capital surplus, and
earned surplus. The definitions of these terms have been pre-
viously discussed, 117 but their importance justifies further elab-
oration. This Part VI of the new statute may be explained in
this language :118
Stated capital, in general, is the legal capital of the corpor-
ation which is set aside and permanently dedicated to the busi-
ness of the corporation. It is usually considered to be the
amount of stockholder-contributed funds which should be legally
safeguarded against impairment. More specifically, stated cap-
ital is the money or property paid in for par value shares and,
in the case of no-par shares, such amounts allocated to stated
capital, increased by any amounts therefter transferred from
surplus (either capital surplus or earned surplus) and decreased
by any amounts transferred therefrom to capital surplus as
permitted by the new law.
Capital surplus is that part of the total consideration paid
for the stock in excess of the value allocated to stated capital.
The new statute, as did the prior one, gives statutory permission
to credit a portion of paid-in capital to a capital surplus ac-
113. LA. R.S. 12:62F (Supp. 1968).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 63A.
116. Id. § 63B.
117. See page - supra.
118. This explanation is taken from a letter dated Nov. 20, 1968, to Ben R.
Miller by Leo P. Michiels, the certified public accountant who served as liaison
from the Society of Louisiana Certified Public Accountants to the Committee which
drafted the proposed revision of the Louisiana Business Corporation Law.
[Vol. XXIX
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
count.119 The reason generally is to permit payment of divi-
dends in some future year in the presence of unrecovered losses
(although notice to the shareholders would be required) .120 The
new statute also permits capital surplus to include surplus aris-
ing from revaluation of assets to reflect unrealized apprecia-
tion in value of assets.'2 1
Earned surplus is simply the excess of surplus over capital
surplus (for example, the excess of assets over liabilities plus
stated capital). It is therefore the cumulation of all undis-
tributed profits earned by the corporation and not transferred
by appropriate procedure to stated capital or capital surplus
accounts. It is from this source that ordinarily dividends can
be paid by the corporation which are entitled to be considered
by the shareholders and the general public as coming from
earnings of the corporation. This is because shareholders and
share purchasers usually assume that dividends represent profits
of the business and not a partial return of funds invested.
The significance of the above terms is to provide the sources
from which dividends can legally be paid, and to provide the
rules as to when dividends should be accompanied by notice
that they are not ordinary dividends (for example, not out of
earnings of the corporation) .122
The board is permitted to create reserves out of earned sur-
plus. 123 This is because the balance of earned surplus should not
be the sole test of whether dividends should be paid. The board
must also consider the financial position of the corporation in
determining dividend policies because the enterprise may have
no substantial amount of surplus available for disbursement to
stockholders even though large earnings have been made in
the past and not distributed. The use of reserves is to withhold
amounts of earnings from dividend appropriations, a policy
of retaining profit funds on a basis that is temporary, rather
than to permanently transfer the earned surplus to stated cap-
ital. The reserves are usually to build up a "buffer" equity to
absorb possible losses and permit stabilization of dividends.
Where the reserves are decreased or abolished, they are re-
turned to earned surplus.
119. LA. R.S. 12:61 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 25.
120. LA. R.S. 12:63A (Supp. 1968).
121. Id. § 1E(3).
122. Id. §§ 62, 63 makes -this significance apparent.
123. Id. § 62B.
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For example: Assume X corporation is formed to go into
the manufacturing business. The board of directors estimated
that it will need $100,000 in capital funds and that the busi-
ness will suffer losses for the first three years which will prob-
ably total $30,000-$50,000, after which it expects the product
will become established, and that profitable operations will
result. The board decides to issue no-par stock having a stated
capital of $50,000, the balance of the money paid in to be
allocated to capital surplus. After the third year of the cor-
poration's operations, the net worth section of the balance
sheet is, as follows:
Capital Stock $ 50,000
Capital Surplus 50,000
100,000
Less-Deficit (35,000) $ 65,000
The fourth year of operations results in a profit of $10,000 and
projections indicate that the fifth year profit will be $50,000.
Some of the alternatives open to the board for dividend con-
siderations would be the following:
(a) At any time during the first three years, the board
could have decided to pay a dividend out of the excess
of capital surplus over the deficit in earned surplus.
However, any of such dividends would have had to
have been accompanied by notice to the shareholders.
(b) In respect to the fourth year, the board could decide
to pay a dividend up to $10,000 as an ordinary dividend
i(without notice) or up to $25,000 (with notice as to
the status of the $15,000 portion of the dividends).
(c) In regard to the fifth year, if the company actually
realizes the $50,000 net profit, the board could decide
to pay a dividend of $60,000 (without notice) or up
to $75,000 (with notice as to the $15,000 portion of
the dividend).
PART VII
Shareholders
The only changes the new act makes with respect to "sub-
scriptions for shares" are these :124
124. LA. R.S. 12:71 (Supp. 1968), cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 6.
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"(1) A pre-incorporation subscription, although normally ir-
revocable for a period of one year as before, can be
revoked if all subscribers consent provided corporate
existence has not begun;
"(2) If a subscriber is released after corporate existence is
begun it is deemed a purchase by the corporation of
those shares ;125
"(3) Calls for payment on subscriptions shall be uniform;
and
"(4) In event of default on a subscription the corporation,
as one of its options, may 'cancel the subscription if
payment of the full price has not been made'-whereas
the prior statute read 'If no payment has been made-
the corporation may forfeit the shares to itself.' 126
(Emphasis added.)
Under the prior statute, unless denied by the articles, stock-
holders had certain defined preemptive rights; but under the
new statute shareholders have no preemptive rights unless the
articles state they shall. 127 It suffices, however, to simply state
in the articles that "shareholders shall have preemptive rights"
unless special rules are desired.
Even though the articles might not provide for preemptive
rights it may well be that Louisiana courts would nonetheless
exercise their equity jurisdiction and give shareholders quasi-
preemptive rights in order to hold directors to high standards of
good faith and fairness in the exercise of their power to issue
125. LA. R.S. 12:71C (Supp. 1968), but cf. id. § 71E "Release" of a Sub-
scriber (in which case the shares are considered as purchased by the corporation)
must contemplate a mutual nonpayment (in which case the shares are considered
as unsubscribed).
126. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 6F. (Retained is its further option of a civil
action to collect the full amount of any deficiency following a public auction of
the shares).
127. LA. R.S. 12:72, 24C(1) (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 28.
The statutes of California, Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and
Pennsylvania expressly deny, as does the new Louisiana Act, preemptive rights
unless granted by the charter. The statutes of Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Utah (as did Louisiana under the prior act) expressly
grant such rights unless denied by the articles. The Model Act now gives both
types of statutory provision. See 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 24 (1960).
Under the prior statute if all the authorized shares had been allotted to satisfy
conversion or option rights, a shareholder would "have no preemptive right to sub-
scribe for shares;" so it was perhaps possible to defeat preemptive rights. But as
has been previously discussed, under the new act the charter is automatically
deemed amended to increase the authorized shares to take care of such conversion
and option rights.
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shares. This is the rule in California, for example, where the
statute expressly denies preemptive rights :128
"Although stockholders in California may no longer exercise
pre-emptive rights in California corporations, 'nevertheless
they have the right to demand that directors and officers of
the corporation do not use their positions for their own per-
sonal advantage, or to discriminate between stockholders, or
to so cause stock to be issued as to make a profit for them-
selves or to obtain or retain control of the corporation.'...
Under these circumstances, a shareholder in California is said
to have quasi-pre-emptive rights."
Little change is made by the new act with respect to share-
holder meetings.
It seems clear that, as under the prior act, directors will not
be able to continue themselves in office merely by failing to call
an annual meeting when no date for the holding of an annual
meeting is prescribed in the articles or in the by-laws.2
9
The prior statute did not expressly state that failure to hold
the annual meeting "shall not affect or vitiate the corporate
existence" as does the new statute'2 0 and the statutes of thirty-
four jurisdictions and the Model Act. 13 The new statute deletes
the authorization for a director to alone call a special meeting of
shareholders but retains the authority of the president or the
board, or a shareholder or shareholders holding one-fifth the vot-
ing power, to do so."32 And the new act adds a unique provision
that as to shareholders with whom communication is unlawful
(such as in time of war and some of the stockholders are nation-
als of the enemy nation), action at any meeting is valid "as if
notice had been given to him as otherwise required.'' 3
Under the new act as under the prior one, a sufficient state-
ment of purpose of any special meeting is necessary to validate
action at such a meeting.1 4
128. Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App.2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1962).
129. Silverman v. Gilbert, 185 So.2d 373 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writ re-
fused, 249 La. 384, 186 So.2d 630 (1966).
130. LA. R.S. 12:73A (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 30.
131. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 26, 2.04 (1960).
132. LA. R.S. 12:73B (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 30B.
133. LA. R.S. 12:73D (Supp. 1968).
134. LA. R.S. 12:73D (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 33D. See
Phillips v. Newland, 166 So.2d 357 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writ denied, 246 La.
872, 167 So.2d 679 (1964) holding the notice defective. Cf. Blum v. Latter, 163
So.2d 189 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), where actual knowledge of "purpose" held to
suffice to validate.
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The new act makes a change with respect to the determina-
tion of a "quorum" for shareholder action. The prior statute
merely said a "majority" should constitute a quorum unless
otherwise provided in the articles or by-laws.135 This would ap-
pear to have permitted a provision that as little as two or three
shares (or even one), irrespective of the number outstanding,
would constitute a quorum. 1 6 Unless the articles permit a lesser
number, a majority of the voting power is now necessary for a
quorum. Under the new statute, a quorum normally must consist
of at least "one-fourth of the total voting power," 137 but the new
statute retains the provision that those present may adjourn the
meeting and that if the purpose was election of directors those
present at the second such adjourned meeting shall suffice for a
quorum." s And at a meeting of the shareholders to fill a vacancy
in the office of liquidator, those present in person or by proxy
constitute a quorum."39
The new act makes these changes with respect to voting :140
(1) After notice of redemption of redeemable shares has
been given and the funds therefor irrevocably placed
"with a bank or trust company,''4 those shares cannot
be voted;
(2) Instead of a proxy being revocable despite an agree-
ment to the contrary, the new act permits an irrevocable
proxy but for not longer than three years ;142
(3) A proxy is not revoked by death until written notice is
received ;143
(4) When shares are owned by two or more persons (other
135. La. Corp. Act of 128, § 31B.
136. See Eagle Iron Co. v. Colyar, 156 F. 954 (5th Cir. 1907); Morrill v.
Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 55 N.W. 547 (1893), which held one share-
holder at a properly called meeting constituted a quorum in the absence of a min-
imum requirement.
137. LA. R.S. 12:74B(1) (Supp. 1968).
138. Id. § 74B(3).
139. Id. § 144B.
140. Id. § 75; cf. La. Corp. Act. of 1928, § 32. Most of these conform to pro-
visions of the Model Act and to the more recent or modern statutes of other juris-
dictions. See 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 28-32 (1960). Both the prior
statute and the new one provide that a proxy for a corporation may only be given
by its president unless a certified copy of the by-law provision or board resolution
authorizing a person other than the president to have granted the proxy is at-
tached. It has been suggested that any officer should be authorized by statute to
grant such a proxy.
141. There is no express provision confining this to a bank or trust company
domiciled in Louisiana.
142. LA. R.S. 12:75C(3) (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 32C.
143. LA. R.S. 75C(2) (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 32C.
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than a fiduciary, as to which no change is effected in
the law) any one of the owners can give a proxy to vote
all the shares until notice to the contrary is received ;144
(5) An executor, administrator, tutor or curator can vote the
shares of the estate or person he represents without
having them registered in his name ;145
(6) Unless the articles provide otherwise, voting rights may
be given to creditors, whereas the prior statute denied
such authority unless the articles permitted it ;146
(7) Shares in its parent cannot be voted by the subsidiary,
or counted in determining the voting power of share-
holders of the parent-on the same basic reasoning that
precludes treasury shares from being voted. 1 7
(8) The outmoded concept of closing the transfer books but
no earlier than 40 days prior to a meeting has been dis-
carded; and in lieu a record date not more than 60 days
prior to a meeting can be set as determinative of voting
qualification; and if the board does not specify a date
the act itself provides that the record date for voting at
a meeting is the day before the notice is mailed, or the
day before the meeting if notice is waived-and for all
other purposes it would be the day on which the resolu-
tion was adopted.14 8
(9) If the articles provide that consent by less than all suf-
fices, a formal "meeting" of shareholders is not neces-
sary if written consent to the action is given by what-
ever number would have been required by the articles
or by-laws (whichever is higher) had there been a meet-
ing properly held. 14 9
(10) The right of stockholders to place their shares in a
"voting trust" which others have established must be
144. LA. R.S. 12:75C(5) (Supp. 1968).
145. Id. § 75E. Davidson v. American Paper Mfg. Co., 188 La. 69, 175 So.
753 (1937), had so held.
146. LA. R.S. 12:75H (Supp. 1968).
147. Id. § 75G. See also 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 31 (1960) and
Comments, 28 U. Cur. L. REV. 151-54 (1960) and 76 HARV. L. REV. 1642-55 (1963).
148. LA. R.S. 12:77 (Supp. 1968). This, however, differs from the Model Act,
and that of New York, for example, which authorizes either a closing of the trans-
fer books or the fixing of a record date; but it is in accord with some jurisdictions,
such as Connecticut and Florida. (§ 77B fixes a "record date" where the Board
has not done so).
149. Id. § 76.
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expressly permitted by that agreement itself instead of
being an inherent right.1 50
(11) A voting trust is permitted for fifteen years, instead of
only for ten,1 51 with only one extension permitted not to
exceed ten years-as previously. 152
The Court of Appeal for Orleans held that under the prior
statute a duplicate original of the voting trust (and not a mere
copy or even a photocopy) had to be available at the registered
office for inspection ;153 and the new act makes such a require-
ment more certain.".
PART VIII
Directors and Officers
Provision is made in the new statute for a board of as few
directors as there are shareholders of record-so technically since
there can be a single shareholder there could be a "board" of
one. Counsel would no doubt caution any client wishing a board
of but one on the danger of a court piercing the corporate veil.155
In the Model Act 5 6 and in our former statute 5T a minimum of
three were required; but neither prescribed a maximum term
for directors. The new statute, however, fixes the maximum term
of a director at five years.'5 8 A number of other states likewise
fix a maximum term for directors. For instance, in Ohio, Indiana,
Montana, and Tennessee, the maximum term is three years; in
Pennsylvania, four years; in Connecticut, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, and New Jersey, five years, and in New Mexico, six
years.1 9
150. Id. § 78. Although 43 jurisdictions provide for voting trusts, only 8 (Ar-
kansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
and Washington) had the same requirement as did our prior statute, that such a
voting trust be "open" to all. See 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 32 (1960).
151. LA. R.S. 12:78A (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 33A. Only
seven other states permit an extension: Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska,
New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. But New York's statute, for instance, appears
to permit an indeterminate number of such extensions. See 1 ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 32 (Pocket Parts 1966).
152. LA. R.S. 12:78A (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 33A.
153. State ex rel. Johnson v. The Keystone Life Ins. Co., 93 So.2d 565 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
154. Prior § 33B provided that a "duplicate copy" must be filed, whereas 'the
new statute (LA. R.S. 12:78H (Supp. 1968) states a "duplicate" must be so filed.
155. LA. R.S. 12:81A (Supp. 1968). The corporate shield can still be pierced
and personal liability imposed on one improperly using a corporation as his mere
alter ego. Herbert v. Wiegand, 207 So.2d 882 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). See also
Shreveport Sash & Door Co. v. Ray, 159 So.2d 434 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). But
see Flick v. Salloum, 163 So.2d 143 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
156. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 34 (1960).
157. La. Corp Act of 1928, § 34.
158. LA. R.S. 12:81A (Supp. 1968).
159. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 34, 2.02(5) (1960).
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The former statute 0° expressly stated that a director need
not be a shareholder unless the articles or by-laws so prescribed;
but in addition stated that the "qualifications" of the director
could be prescribed by the articles or the by-laws subject to the
provisions of the chapter. And the Model Act 16 contains the ex-
press provisions that directors need not be residents of the state,
nor shareholders, unless the articles or by-laws so prescribe. It
was the opinion of the drafters of our new statute, however, that
such express language of negation was not necessary and that
it sufficed for those purposes to merely state that the qualifica-
tions of directors were to be as may be prescribed in the articles
or by-laws.6 2
The provisions in the former statute that absence from the
state for six months without leave granted by the board was a
basis for declaring the position vacant, was deleted-as part of
the effort to attract out-of-state people to organize in Louisiana.
Only a majority of the total voting power rather than a re-
quirement of two-thirds, is required to oust a director, with or
without "cause"; but if a director has been elected by the exer-
cise of cumulative voting, he cannot be removed if the votes
against his removal would suffice for election.163
Provision is made for valid meetings of the board or of com-
mittees even though because of law or executive order "notice"
cannot be given all members (for example-to a member in the
military).
The new act expressly makes valid any committee or board
action by unanimous written consent. 6 4 Many other states now
so provide, such as: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida (for close corporations), Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Minnesota, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
160. LA. R.S. 12:34A (Supp. 1968).
161. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 33 (1960).
162. Wight v. Springfield & New London Ry., 117 Mass. 226, 19 Am. Rep.
412 (1875) held holding of shares not an indispensable qualification of a director
unless required by statute or by laws. And North & South Rolling Stock Co. v.
People ex rel. Schaefer, 147 Ill. 234, 35 N.E. 608 (1893) held that in the ab-
sence of statute directors were not required to be residents.
163. LA. R.S. 12:81 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 34.
164. Daly v. Opelousas Ins. Agency, Inc., 181 La. 89, 158 So. 631 (1935)
held unanimous consent signed by all members of the board separately at their
homes, rather than at a formal meeting, sufficed as board authorization for a
transfer of all assets to creditors (which the board was itself authorized to do
since the corporation was "unable to meet its liabilities then matured)." See La.
Corp. Act of 1928, § 41; cf. LA. R.S. 12:121B (Supp. 1968).
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Pennsylvania, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 165
The authority of the board to fill vacancies only applies where
the shareholders have elected less than the number fixed as con-
stituting the board, or where a death, resignation, or removal
of a member has occurred.1 66
The prior requirement that at least the president of a corpo-
ration must be a director was eliminated. The new statute,
further, makes it clear that if one person holds two offices, he
alone cannot sign any certificate or instrument required by law
to be signed by two officers. 167
The new act expressly states that election or appointment of
an officer does not of itself create contract rights ;16s and ex-
pressly states, what was no doubt implied before, that the dis-
cretion given the board to remove officers or agents appointed
by it is with or without cause.1 6 9
Although there was some opinion among those drafting the
new statute that directors be permitted to vote by proxy given
another director or shareholder unless prohibited by the articles,
the new act retains the prohibition against this unless permitted
by the articles.
Detailed provisions appear in the new act" ° as to indemnifica-
tion of officers, directors, employees, and agents; and for pro-
curing insurance for their benefit against claims and losses.
Briefly, while a corporation cannot provide indemnity to one
not fairly and reasonably entitled to it, nonetheless the corpora-
tion may procure, and pay premiums on, insurance covering
claims or losses which it would not have been permitted to in-
demnify.
165. 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 39A (1960) (Pocket Parts 1966).
166. Hackett v. Diversified Chemicals, Inc., 180 So.2d 831 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965).
167. LA. R.S. 12:82A (Supp. 1968).
168. Id. § 82C. A New York Court in 1890 held that the mere fact an officer
was on an annual salary did not create "contract rights" for his employment.
Douglas v. Merchants Ins., 118 N.Y. 484, 23 N.E. 806 (1890). But in 1916 the
New York Court in Cuppy v. Stallwerck Bros., Inc., 216 N.Y. 591, 111 N.E. 249
(1916), distinguished the Douglas case by saying that Mr. Cuppy had been spe-
cifically hired for a year. Cf. Cohen v. Camden Refrigerating & Terminals Co., 129
N.J.L. 519, 30 A.2d 428 (1943) holding that a by-law provision giving right of re-
moval with or without cause controlled even as to one who had been hired for a
specific term.
169. The court in Ginter v. Heco Envelope Co., 316 Ill. 183, 147 N.E. 42
(1925) said that under language such as this only the board and not the president
alone could thus remove an officer or agent without cause.
170. LA. R.S. 12:83 (Supp. 1968).
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Although the board generally has authority to fix the com-
pensation of directors and officers, in 1963 one of Louisiana's
intermediate courts of appeal held 17 1 that resolutions fixing com-
pensation to directors or corporate officers for the performance
of the usual and customary duties of directors and officers could
have no retroactive effect; but the court also ruled that if direc-
tors or officers render unusual or extraordinary services not
within the line of their ordinary duties the circumstances may
give rise to an implied promise to pay compensation.
PART IX
Liability of Directors, Officers, Shareholders, and Subscribers
The liability of directors in all various situations has been
cumulated and stated in two sections. 172 It is expressly stated
that officers and directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders.173 While the recent trend in
Louisiana has been to find at least a quasi fiduciary relationship
owed individual stockholders,17 nonetheless earlier cases perhaps
indicated that no fiduciary relationship was owed individual
shareholders unless the statute expressly said so.1 75
This new act expressly provides that liability of directors or
officers for certain actions such as an unlawful dividend, dis-
tribution of assets or purchase or redemption of shares, is not
only to the corporation and its creditors but to shareholders.
Under both the 1914 and 1928 acts such liability was only "to
the creditors" and a trustee in bankruptcy of a corporation was
held not entitled to assert such a liability.7 6 But for a creditor
to assert a claim, he must have been a creditor at the time of
the unlawful action. 17
The full effect of this express statutory declaration, that
"officers and directors" stand in a "fiduciary relation" not only
to the corporation but to "its stockholders" as well, must await
171. Alexander v. Lindsay, 152 So.2d 261 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ
refused, 244 La. 897, 154 So.2d 767 (1963).
172. LA. R.S. 12:91, 92 (Supp. 1968).
173. Id. § 91. This was taken from N.C. GEN. STAT. 2B (1965 Replacement
Vol.) §§55-35 (1955).
174. William v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937) ; Markey v. Hi-
bernia Homestead Ass'n, 186 So. 757 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939). See also 3 FLETCH-
ER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION § 848 (rev. ed. 1965).
175. Orlando v. Nix, 171 La. 176, 129 So. 810 (1930); Carey v. Dalgarn
Const. Co., 171 La. 246, 130 So. 344 (1930). See also Mente & Co. v. Louisiana
State Rice Milling Co., 176 La. 476, 146 So. 28 (1933).
176. Smalley v. Bernstein, 165 La. 1, 115 So. 347 (1928).
177. Nola Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 182 La. 432, 162 So. 35 (1935).
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developing jurisprudence. For example, it is said that "By the
weight of authority a director or officer has the same right to
buy stock from a stockholder of the company as anyone else."
'
"1 8
But the same authority states that : 
1 7
"Under the minority rule directors are considered trustees
for individual stockholders with respect to their stock, and
this rule goes to the extreme of holding that they cannot pur-
chase stock from a stockholder without giving him the benefit
of any official knowledge they possess which may increase
the value of the stock. This view has been adopted by a sub-
stantial number of cases and has been approved by practically
every legal writer in this field. And the same rule applies
where the officer purchases the stock from the former stock-
holder's widow. Under the minority rule, it seems that the
stockholder may recover from the officer, even though an
examination of the books and records of the company would
have revealed to the stockholder the real situation, on the
ground that no duty to use diligence in discovering a fraud is
imposed on the injured party. Thus, widows and others with
little experience concerning business matters are not pre-
cluded from relief simply because the account books of the
company contained all the information possessed by the offi-
cer purchasing the stock, and therefore the widow might have
ascertained everything known to the defendant by resort to
the books.
"Persuasive reasons may be given for applying the minority
rule to the officers and directors of a large corporate organi-
zation, where its stock is widely distributed and held in com-
paratively small units. The officers and directors of such a
corporation, because of their official connection therewith,
have a knowledge of its assets and liabilities, the condition of
its business, its prospects for the future, and the value of
stock, which would be difficult if not practically impossible
for the ordinary stockholder to obtain. In such a case it seems
reasonable to require such officers or directors to make a full
disclosure of all the pertinent facts when selling to, or pur-
chasing individual stock from, a shareholder in the corpora-
tion."
178. 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION § 1168.1 (rev. ed. 1965).
179. Id. § 1168.2; of. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d
317 (5th Cir. 1959), affirming 159 F.Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958) ; Markey v. Hi-
bernia Homestead Ass'n, 186 So. 757 (La. App. Orl. Cir. (1939).
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Louisiana is treated as following this minority rule.'8 0 It
would appear that the express provision in the new act that this
fiduciary duty is owed to stockholders as well as to the corpora-
tion' s ' would clearly either place or keep Louisiana in accord
with this so-called minority rule. In the light of the new act
giving far greater power and authority to officers and directors,
this was considered both wise and proper. Moreover, this is in
full accord with the new federal corporation jurisprudential rules
which are developing under the Securities and Exchange Act,8 2
and particularly under Rule 10b(5) of the commission. 18 3
The now famus Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. case and other
prior and subsequent decisions appear to have established a rule
in the federal courts that (1) even in the absence of the state's
statute imposing such a strict fiduciary obligation on officers
and directors to stockholders individually, and (2) even if the
activities of the corporation are not such as to require registra-
tion with the SEC, and (3) even if the particular "security" is
a so-called "exempt" security, such as bank stock, and (4) even
if otherwise a wholly intrastate transaction, if any such officer
or director buying or selling stock in his own corporation either
"directly or indirectly by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails" should "either make any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing" it is unlawful, and subjects such officers and directors to
criminal penalties and also to private suits for damages. 8
Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933185 would appear to
exempt certain securities including bank stock from that sec-
tion (which imposes civil liability arising in connection with a
prospectus or communication). But Rule 10b (5) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission was promulgated under Section
180. 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION § 1168.1 (rev. ed. 1965).
181. LA. R.S. 12:91 (Supp. 1968).
182. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78a (1964).
183. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
184. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
March 4, 1968; A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Mathe-
son v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1953) ; Fischman v. Ratheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D. N.Y. 1967) ; Nemitz v. Cunny,
221 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. 111. 1963) ; Rosen v. Bergman, 40 F.R.D. 19 (S.D. N.Y.
1967). See also Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 649 (1954), entitled "Civil Action by Private
Persons Under Sec. 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934."
185. 15 U.S.C. § 77L (1964).
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10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934186 which does not re-
fer to any "security" being exempt from its application. Although
Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b (5) promulgated thereunder are criminal in nature, do not
expressly authorize civil damages and merely say the proscribed
actions or inactions shall be "unlawful" conduct, the courts have
held :187 (1) civil suits for damages as well as criminal prosecu-
tions lie under this Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b (5) ; and (2) that
a civil suit or criminal action can lie under this Section 10 (b)
and Rule 10b(5) even though, (if a so-called "exempt" security
was involved in an intrastate transaction) such suit or action
would not have been permitted under the Security Act of 1933.
In this connection it is apparently significant to the courts
that even Section 17 (c) of the Securities Act of 1933188 (which
deals with interstate transactions involving either schemes to
defraud or schemes to obtain money or property "by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading") was made expressly applicable to all securities
classified as "exempt" securities under Section 3 of the 1933
Act.18
9
The distinction appears to be that fraud is not essential to
the civil actions permitted by Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities
Act of 1933190 whereas Section 10(b) and Rule 10b(5) under
the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934191 are intended to, and
do, extend the remedies where there is proven or implied fraud.
As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said in the Fisch-
man case: 192
"Were this not true, Section 11 (and 12) of the 1933 Act,
designed to protect investors even where there is no fraud,
would afford a shelter or sanctuary for those who defraud
investors."
The Court of Appeals in the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. case,
however, at least intimated that actual fraud is not even essential
for imposition of Rule 10b (5) liability when it said that this rule
186. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1964).
187. See note 184 supra.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1964).
189. Id. § 77C.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 77k and I (1964).
191. Id. § 78j (b).
192. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
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"implements a standard of conduct that encompasses negligence
as well as actual fraud. 193
On March 29, 1968, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York-one of the country's chief com-
mercial courts-in the now famous Escott v. Barcris case im-
posed these hazards of personal liability not only on an officer
and any director (either an "inside" or an "outside" director)
but on the company's lawyer, accountants, and underwriter as
well, who sign or certify a registration statement filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission of a company going public,
which contains a material misstatement, omission or inaccuracy,
unless he made an independent investigation and had "reasonable
grounds" (those of a prudent man in the management of his own
affairs) to believe the statement accurate.19 4
The Securities and Exchange Commission, incidentally, as-
serts it has a definite right to aid private litigants in their civil
suits for damages, by participating amicus curiae.
95
Escott v. Barcriss6 involved a mushrooming business which
outgrew both the managerial talents and finances of its origi-
nators-two men named Vitala and Pugliese, who began a small
bowling alley construction business as partners in 1946. Bowling
itself mushroomed following the introduction in 1952 of the auto-
matic pin setting machines and so did their business-which
they incorporated in 1955. Their sales increased dramatically
but so did their need for cash to operate. In early 1961 there was
a public sale of its debentures. By that time, however, matters
had taken such a decided turn for the worse that by October
1962 it applied for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act. This was soon converted into a regular bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Later in November 1963, the company was
placed in a Chapter X reorganization. At the time of the court's
decision in the Escott case (March 1968) that proceeding was
still pending.
Escott, a purchaser of some of the 1961 debentures, sued the
officers, directors (both "inside" and "outside" directors), the
193. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), affirming in part, reversing and renanding in part, 258 F. Supp.
262 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
194. Escott v. Barchris Constr., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
195. Loomis & Eisenberg, General Counsel and Assistant General Counsel, Se-
curities & Exchange Commission, The SEC as amicus curiae in Shareholder Liti-
gation- A Reply, 52 A.B.A.J. 749-753 (1966).
196. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Co., 283 F.Supp. 643, 653-54 (S.D. N.Y.
1968).
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"inside" accountant, and the "outside" firm of public account-
ants, and also both the "house" counsel and a director who was
also a member of a firm of attorneys which had been employed
in connection with the SEC registration. The opinion of the fed-
eral district judge covers 54 pages. These excerpts are among
the most significant:
"What are 'matters as to which an average prudent in-
vestor ought reasonably to be informed'? It seems obvious
that they are matters which such an investor needs to know
before he can make an intelligent, informed decision whether
or not to buy the security.
"Early in the history of the Act, a definition of mate-
riality was given in Matter of Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C.
6, 8 (1934), which is still valid today. A material fact was
there defined as:
... a fact which if it had been correctly stated or dis-
closed would have deterred or tended to deter the average
prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question.'
"The average prudent investor is not concerned with
minor inaccuracies or with errors as to matters which are
of no interest to him. The facts which tend to deter him from
purchasing a security are facts which have an important
bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corpora-
tion or its business.
"Judged by this test, there is no doubt that many of the
misstatements and omissions in this prospectus were mate-
rial. This is true of all of them which relate to the state of
affairs in 1961, i.e., the overstatement of sales and gross
profit for the first quarter, the understatement of contin-
gent liabilities as of April 30, the overstatement of orders
on hand and the failure to disclose the true facts with respect
to officers' loans, customers' delinquencies, application of
proceeds and the prospective operation of several alleys."'19 7
Of particular interest to attorneys is the court's discussion
and decision with regard to the defendants who were attorneys.
One was a young lawyer, having only been admitted to the bar
some four years prior to the debenture issue. He had been em-
ployed as "house counsel" and assistant secretary in October
1960. "Unfortunately for him," said the court, "he became secre-
197. Id. at 681.
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tary and a director on April 17, 1961, after the first version of
the registration statement had been filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. He signed the later amendments,
thereby becoming responsible for the accuracy of the prospectus
in its final form."
As to him, the court said:
"As a lawyer, he should have known his obligations under
the statute. He should have known that he was required to
make a reasonable investigation of the truth of all the state-
ments in the unexpertised portion of the document which he
signed. Having failed to make such an investigation, he did
not have reasonable ground to believe that all these state-
ments were true. [He] has not established his due diligence
defenses except as to the audited 1960 figures."' 19 8
A second attorney was also sued as a director. His law firm
had been special counsel to Barcris. This is the court's opinion
holding him, also, liable for civil damages:
"He became a director of Barcris in October 1960. His
law firm was counsel to Barcris in matters pertaining to the
registration of securities. [He] drafted the registration state-
ment for the stock issue in 1959 and for the warrants in
January 1961. He also drafted the registration statement for
the debentures. In the preliminary division of work between
him and the underwriters' counsel, [he] took initial responsi-
bility for preparing the registration statement, while devot-
ing his efforts in the first instance to preparing the indenture.
"There is no valid basis for plaintiffs' accusation that [he]
knew that the prospectus was false in some respects and
incomplete and misleading in others. Having seen him testify
at length, I am satisfied as to his integrity. I find that [he]
honestly believed that the registration statement was true
and that no material facts had been omitted from it.
"In this belief he was mistaken, and the fact is that for
all his work, he never discovered any of the errors or omis-
sions which have been recounted at length in this opinion,
with the single exception of Capitol Lanes. He knew that
Barcris had not sold this alley and intended to operate it,
but he appears to have been under the erroneous impression
that [the CPA firm] had knowingly sanctioned its inclusion
198. Id. at 687.
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in sales because of the allegedly temporary nature of the
operation.
"[He] contends that a finding that he did not make a
reasonable investigation would be equivalent to a holding
that a lawyer for an issuing company, in order to show due
diligence, must make an independent audit of the figures
supplied to him by his client. I do not consider this to be a
realistic statement of the issue. There were errors and omis-
sions here which could have been detected without an audit.
The question is whether, despite his failure to detect them,
[he] made a reasonable effort to that end....
"It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the state-
ments of his client and that to require him to verify their
accuracy would set an unreasonably high standard. This is
too broad a generalization. It is all a matter of degree. To
require an audit would obviously be unreasonable. On the
other hand, to require a check of matters easily verifiable is
not unreasonable. Even honest clients can make mistakes. The
statute imposes liability for untrue statements regardless
of whether they are intentionally untrue. The way to prevent
mistakes is to test oral information by examining the original
written record."'199
The corporation's banker was brought on the board-the
inducement if any was needed, said the court, was assurances
that his bank would receive a deposit of $1,000,000.00 from the
sale of the securities. Nonetheless, he was an "outside" director,
i.e., one who was not an officer of Barcris. In holding him also
liable for damages, the court said:
"As to the non-expertised portions, however, [he] is
in a different position. He seems to have been under the
impression that [the CPA firm] was responsible for all the
figures. This impression was not correct, as he would have
realized if he had read the prospectus carefully. [He] made
no investigation of the accuracy of the prospectus. He relied
on the assurance of Vitolo and Russo, and upon the informa-
tion he had received in answer to his inquiries back in Febru-
ary and early March. These inquiries were general ones, in
the nature of a credit check. The information which he re-
ceived in answer to them was also general, without specific
199. Id. at 689-90.
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reference to the statements in the prospectus, which was not
prepared until some time thereafter.
"It is true that [he] became a director on the eve of the
financing. He had little opportunity to familiarize himself
with the company's affairs. The question is whether, under
such circumstances, [he] did enough to establish his due
diligence defense with respect to the non-expertised portions
of the prospectus.
"Although there is a dearth of authority under Section 11
on this point, an English case under the analogous Companies
Act is of some value. In Adams v. Thrift, (1915) 1 Ch. 557,
aff'd, (1915) 2 Ch. 21, it was held that a director who knew
nothing about the prospectus and did not even read it, but
who relied on the statement of the company's managing direc-
tor that it was 'all right,' was liable for its untrue statements.
See also In the Matter of Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4
S.E.C. 706 (1939).
"Section 11 imposes liability in the first instance upon
a director, no matter how new he is. He is presumed to know
his responsibility when he becomes a director. He can escape
liability only by using that reasonable care to investigate the
facts which a prudent man would employ in the management
of his own property. In my opinion, a prudent man would not
act in an important matter without any knowledge of the
relevant facts, in sole reliance upon representations of per-
sons who are comparative strangers and upon general in-
formation which does not purport to cover the particular
case. To say that such minimal conduct measures up to the
statutory standard would, to all intents and purposes, absolve
new directors from responsibility merely because they are
new. This is not a sensible construction of Section 11, when
one bears in mind its fundamental purpose of requiring full
and truthful disclosure for the protection of investors. '"200
A subsequent decision further extended this rule of severe
liability on those in a fiduciary relationship who fail to use "due
diligence" before lending their name to misleading material so-
liciting purchasers of their corporation's stock. For in Globus v.
Law Research Service, Inc.,20 1 a different judge from, however,
the same experienced federal court, upheld a jury's award of
200. Id. at 688.
201. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
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punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. These
are pertinent excerpts from that opinion :202
"... The question therefore comes down to whether actual
knowledge of the misstatement alone is sufficient or whether,
in addition, this knowledge must be coupled with intent to
defraud. Support for the view that intent to defraud is un-
necessary can be gleaned from the legislation itself. First, the
action of deceit and its requisites have deep roots in the com-
mon law, see, e.g., Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51, 100
Eng. Rep. 450 (1789) ; Prosser, Torts 699-700 (3d ed. 1964).
It seems reasonable, in light of this history, to infer that if
Congress had desired to use an 'intent to defraud' concept in
these sections of the securities acts, it merely had to refer to
time-honored classic phrases which were quite familiar, see
The Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Instead, words
referring primarily to conduct, but implying premeditation
with a view to gain at the expense of others, were employed,
such as 'manipulative . . . device' or 'contrivance.' Second,
the criminal penalties visited upon one who files a false and
misleading statement only require wilfulness and intentional
conduct, but do not require an intent to defraud, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77yyy, 78ff. To impose upon the civil plaintiff the burden
of demonstrating intent to defraud when no such burden is
imposed upon the Government in a related criminal case aris-
ing out of the same statement or document would create an
anomalous result. Since the statutes in question, 17(a) and
10(b), do not force one to this rather odd conclusion, they
should not be so read. See III Loss, Securities Regulation 1442
n. 45, 1766 (1961 ed.). Therefore the Court rejects defen-
dants' contentions that intent to defraud is an essential ele-
ment of a private cause of action under §§ 17 (a), 10 (b) and
Rule 10b-5."
These decisions may be amended in part or even reversed on
appeal or by later decisions; but, nonetheless, they illustrate a
seemingly expanding doctrine.
The devolution of substantially unlimited power on the ma-
jority stockholders imposes on them a correlative fiduciary duty
to exercise good faith towards the minority stockholders.2°3 This
202. Id. at 191, 192, 198.
203. 18 AM. Jur. 2d §§ 496-509 (1965). See also Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1366
(1954) : "Minority Stockholder's Right to Enjoin Further or Additional Issuance
of Stock."
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is particularly true where the majority stockholders also con-
stitute or control the board. Actions by a dominant majority of
stockholders or of a board to issue stock to themselves at less
than value or for less than the price at which it is made available
to the minority, or to issue new shares only to themselves so as
to gain permanent voting control, or to unreasonably and oppres-
sively refuse to declare dividends so as to force minority stock-
holders to sell their stock, are all vulnerable to attack.2 °4
The question of whether or not a stockholder's suit in the
nature of a derivative action for money damages predicated on
negligence and a breach of fiduciary duty is one for which the
plaintiff would be entitled to a jury under the seventh amend-
ment to the United States Constitution is not settled as of this
writing. The Ninth Circuit has held :205
"Having in mind the necessity of scrutinizing, with ut-
most care, any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial, we hold that where a claim of breach of fiduciary duty
is predicated upon underlying conduct, such as negligence,
which is actionable in a direct suit at common law, the issue
of whether there has been such a breach is, subject to ap-
propriate instructions, a jury question. We therefore conclude
that, in the context of this case, the question concerning
204. Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1962) ; Hor-
witz v. Balaban, 112 F.Supp. 99 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) ; Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson
Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268 (1936) Carlson v. Ringgold County
Mut. Tel. Co., 108 N.W.2d 478 (Iowa 1961) ; Berg v. United Bd. & Carton Corp.,
106 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1951) ; 19 C.J.S. § 795 (1955). See also Crichton v. Webb Press
Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (1904); Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1957).
205. DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 837 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964); cf. Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d
100, 109 (8th Cir. 1967); Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp.,
294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Doughty v. Nebel Towing Co., 270 F. Supp.
957, 961 (E.D. La. 1967). In a letter to Ben R. Miller, dated December 11, 1968,
Thomas J. Andrd, Jr., a Professor of Corporation Law at Tulane University, stated
his opinion of the problem in this language:
"The difficulty with De Pinto is the highly conceptual view taken by that
court. It is true of course in theory that a stockholder's derivative action merely
asserts the right of the corporation, 'but if the action were not originally
brought in equity, there would be no action at all.
"On the other hand, if one were to predict what the Supreme Court were to
do, it would be my guess that the Court would follow De Pinto where the
remedy sought is damages. This would be true, in my opinion, even though the
corporation seeks for example, an accounting, which traditionally is an equit-
able remedy. Furthermore, because of the merger of law and equity, the Court
is likely to say that the derivative action is not brought in equity as such, but
merely as a civil action under the merged system.
"A major difficulty in allowing the jury to assess damages in these cases
would of course be the extremely complex nature of corporate affairs for the
average juror. Perhaps the court would take this into consideration, but the
trend certainly is toward broadening the Seventh Amendment rights."
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breach of fiduciary duty, as well as negligence, should have
been submitted to the jury."
The reasoning of the court would appear to be:
1. Historically, a stockholder's derivative action was an in-
vention of equity. Without such a remedy, the stockholder
would have had no redress against breaches of fiduciary
obligation.
2. But since it is a corporate right which is being asserted,
and not the right of the shareholder, the nature of the
corporation's cause of action against the directors and
officers determines whether or not a jury is required.
3. If the nature of the cause of action is such that it would
have been cognizable at common law, then the seventh
amendment requires a jury trial.
4. Since the suit there asked for money damages against the
directors, and was founded on allegations of gross negli-
gence, it was one traditionally cognizable at common law,
and a jury trial would be required.
But the Second Circuit, with a dissent, has summarily re-
jected this Ninth Circuit holding, and held that a stockholder's
derivative action "analytically may be composed of two parts,
but-has always been treated as one unitary action brought in
equity" and hence without a jury.20°
PART X
Reports, Records, Registered Office, and Agents
The new act calls for the filing of an "Initial Report" along
with the articles, to be signed by each incorporator personally or
through a duly appointed agent.2° 7 A duplicate original of this
report, or a copy certified by the Secretary of State, is required
to be attached to the copy of the articles which are to be there-
after filed with the Recorder of Mortgages. This report should
set forth the location and post office address of the registered
office, the full name and post office address of each registered
agent, and the names and post office addresses of the first di-
rectors. This information was heretofore generally included in
the articles but it was not basic to the corporation and might
206. Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) ; petition for cert. pending.
207. LA. R.S. 12:25A, 81B, 101 (Supp. 1968).
1969]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
change from time to time-and hence the desirability of provid-
ing for the furnishing of this information in an "initial report."
The prior statute20 required a detailed and verified initial or
original report with respect to the consideration paid or received
for shares, known as the "90 day report." The new statute does
not require this particular report. It does, however, as did the
prior statute, require an annual report to be made to the Secre-
tary of State.20 9
In the original draft of the revision, it was proposed that for
non-competing stockholders individually or as a group to be en-
titled to inspect the books and records, the demand had to be
made by the holder or holders of at least 5 % of the stock; but
subsequently, to meet objections, the prior provision permitting
as little as 2 % to have this right was retained in the new statute.
The new statute also retained the provision that business compet-
itors must own at least 25 % of the stock to be entitled to make
such an inspection.210 Most of the statutes of other states do not
have such a latter restriction and relegate the corporation to the
courts to protect it against inspection abuse by stockholders who
are business competitors. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held,
however:
"The Act does not deny to a stockholder, who is interested in
a corporation which may be authorized to engage in a com-
petitive business, the right of examining the books of the
corporation where he does not own 25 % of the stock. It with-
holds the privilege of examination only where the stockhold-
er is interested in a corporation that is actually engaged in a
competitive business. The argument of counsel (that the
stated corporate objects and purposes control) would lead to
many absurd consequences for it is common knowledge that
the objects and purposes of the business, as outlined in the
charters of most corporations, cover a broad field so as to
enable the company to engage in various enterprises if time
and circumstances make it necessary or desirable.
' '211
A Louisiana appellate court recently held that while custom-
arily such an "inspection" would have to be in the registered of-
208. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 18.
209. LA. R.S. 12:102 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 39.
210. LA. R.S. 12:103D (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 38E. Re-
tained also was the requirement of ownership for at least six months, as a pre-
requisite to this right of inspection.
211. Pittman v. Riverside Realty Co., 214 La. 71, 79, 36 So.2d 642, 644
(1948). This was decided under § 38 of the prior statute, now LA. R.S. 12:103D
(Supp. 1968).
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fice of the corporation, a court could require the books and
records to be produced some other place:
"Our corporation statute being silent on the place of inspec-
tion, it is our opinion that the place of inspection is not re-
stricted as a matter of law to the offices of the corporation,
but that a Trial Court has discretion to order it held else-
where just as it has discretion to fix the time of inspection
and other incidentals connected therewith. But for many ob-
vious reasons the inspection should ordinarily be ordered to
be held at the place where the records are kept, that is, at the
registered or principal office of the corporation, and ordi-
narily it would amount to an abuse of discretion to order the
inspection held elsewhere. Our remarks are confined to do-
mestic corporations having their principal offices within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. '212
The defendant in that case, under the particular facts in-
volved was required to take certain records to the office of the
plaintiff's attorney for duplicating by him.
Nonresident stockholders owning stock of a value in excess
of $10,000 (the present money test for federal diversity juris-
diction) and who otherwise would have the right of inspection
of the corporation's books and records, may invoke the jurisdic-
tion of a federal court to enforce that right.213 This is in addition
of course, to the state court remedies of mandamus and civil
damages.
A law firm itself may be agent for service of process, with
service sufficient if made on any member of the firm.
214
PART XI
Mergers and Consolidations
The new statute eliminated the prior requirement that the
constituent corporations to a merger or consolidation each have
authority to carry on the same or similar business. 215 This avoids
212. Brandt Glass Co. v. The New Orleans Housing Mart, Inc., 193 So.2d
321, 324 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
213. Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 88 S.Ct. 1332 (1968). See Enforce-
ment of the Right to Inspect Books and Records in 25 CORP. J. No. 14, at 315-18,
October-November 1968, published by The Corporation Trust Company and C. T.
Corporation System.
214. LA. R.S. 12:104C (Supp. 1968).
215. Id. § 111; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 47A.
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the possibility of such decisions as that of a New Jersey court,21
which prohibited a manufacturer of fountain pens and pencils
from merging with one making razor blades.
The new statute also eliminated the requirement of clearances
from the Louisiana Revenue and Labor Departments before a
merger is effective since obligations of the merged corporation
can be enforced against the constituent corporation as well as
against the surviving corporation. 217
In a merger, and also in a consolidation, the consideration can
consist in part of stock of another, outside, corporation. 218
The new statute provides219 that dissenting stockholders who
take the proper steps 220 to protect their rights, must be paid the
"fair cash" value of their shares if the merger or consolidation
is not approved by "two-thirds" of the total voting power of that
corporation-although the merger or consolidation will become
effective if approved by two-thirds of the voting power present
at the meeting (or such lesser number of a foreign corporation
as the laws of the state of its domicile may require.)
The prior statute gave such rights to dissenters unless the ac-
tion dissented from had been approved by eighty percent of the
total voting power ;221 and a legislative committee amendment
sought to retain this. 22 Through oversight two subsections of
the new statute relating to the rights of dissenters to a voluntary
transfer of corporate assets or to a merger of consolidation, were
not similarly amended 2 22 but it would appear clear that the
eighty percent vote is required in both instances. Dissenters'
rights are discussed beginning at page 486 hereof.
If a plan of a merger would expressly make such a charter
amendment as would require approval of other types of stock
than common stock if submitted separately as an amendment,
then that approval must also be obtained.2 2 4 (The new statute
does not state this is required for a "consolidation.") But ap-
proval of the stockholders of a subsidiary is not required for a
merger with its parent corporation (either into the parent or
216. Imperial Trust Co. v. Magazine Repeating Razor Co., 138 N.J.Eq. 66,
46 A.2d 449 (1946).
217. LA. R.S. 12:115E (Supp. 1968) ; but cf. id. § 131B (3).
218. Id. §§ 112H, 113A(3). See also id. § 131B and Comment (c) to § 112.
219. Id. § 112C. But cf. § 131B(3) and pages 481-86.
220. Id. § 131. See pages 486-87 infra.
221. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 52A.
222. LA. R.S. 12:131A (Supp. 1968).
223. Id. §§ 112C, 121B.
224. Id. § 112C.
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into the subsidiary), if that parent corporation owns at least
ninety percent of the stock of the subsidiary ;225 but dissenting
stockholders of the subsidiary would nonetheless have their
rights to be paid the fair market value of their shares.
226
Unless the statute of a state makes it clear that the net sur-
plus of the constituent corporations remains available for pay-
ment of dividends by the new or surviving corporation in the
event of merger or consolidation, it perhaps could be argued,
especially in cases of consolidation, that all assets with which the
new corporation begins business is "capital"; and that dividends
could be paid only out of the subsequent earnings. To avoid any
such possibility the new Louisiana statute provides that:
"Following a merger into, or creation by consolidation of, a
corporation, such corporation's earned surplus shall not ex-
ceed the sum of the earned surpluses of the merging or con-
solidating business corporations, nonprofit corporations and
foreign corporations, as reduced by any distributions or
transfers therefrom in connection with the merger or con-
solidation. 227
The prior statute required consideration of a proposed mer-
ger or consolidation by the shareholders to be at a meeting spe-
cially called for that purpose; but the new statute permits a
merger or consolidation to be approved at an annual meeting too,
provided of course proper notice has been given.2 2 8 Further, un-
der the new statute, the merger or consolidation is to be filed
with the Secretary of State, and becomes effective with that fil-
ing. Only a certificate of the merger or consolidation, certified
by the Secretary of State (rather than a certified copy of the full
agreement) need be filed with the Recorder of Mortgages of the
parishes wherein the registered offices of the constituent cor-
poration were located. 229 Although not expressly so stated, it
would appear that a failure to do this local filing, however, would
not invalidate the merger or consolidation.230
225. Id. § 11211.
226. Id. § 131A, 131C (last sentence of each subsection).
227. Id. § 62C.
228. Id. § 112C; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 48B.
229. LA. R.S. 12:114 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 48, 49, 50,
under which the agreement was first filed with the Secretary of State and then
with the Recorder of Mortgages of the parish wherein the constituent corporation
had their registered office and also in the conveyance records of any parish in
which the constituent corporation owned immovable property. A consolidation into
a new corporation, however, was filed first with the Recorder of Mortgages and
then with the Secretary of State. But under the prior statute the merger or the
consolidation !became effective with the Recorder of Mortgages filing.
230. LA. R.S. 12:114, 25C (Supp. 1968).
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Neither the prior statute nor the new one defines "merger"
or "consolidation"; and one of Louisiana's intermediate appellate
courts has held that to be a "merger" the shareholders of the
constituent companies must retain (or be given) a proprietary
interest in the resulting corporation. 3 1
That decision reads in part:
"The indenture attached to the petition, being labeled as a
merger, is nothing more than an outright sale of the corpora-
tion. The stockholders of the Osborn Life Insurance Company
are to be paid $8,000, which amount is to be divided pro rata
among them, upon the surrender and cancellation of their
stock, and they are to have no interest or control in the new
corporation. The refusal on the part of any stockholder of
the Osborn Life Insurance Company to surrender his stock
will not give the stockholder any right in the merged corpora-
tion but his pro rata share of the funds shall be held by the
new corporation for the account of the stockholder.
"A merger of two corporations is formed by the stockholders
placing their assets and liabilities into a common pool and
forming one single corporate body wherein the interest of
stockholders of the two corporations are retained in the newly
created corporation.
"Where either a 'merger' or a consolidation of corporations
is effected, the new corporation acquires all assets, property
rights, and franchises of dissolved corporations, and their
stockholders become its stockholders.'23 2
The facts in this case were these: The charter of the Osborn
Life Insurance Company contained an agreement that no stock-
holder could sell his stock without first offering it to the others
and each stockholder would have the right to purchase his share
of the offered stock, plus his share of that part which other
stockholders might not wish to acquire. Mrs. McCarthy owned
ten shares. She objected to the efforts of the president and the
board to sell the assets of the corporation to another corporation
or its owners. Thereupon both corporations amended their char-
231. McCarthy v. Osborn, 223 La. 305, 65 So.2d 776 (1953). Under LA. R.S.
12:112H, 113B(3) (Supp. 1968) it is clear that shareholders of the constituent
corporation may receive consideration other than shares in the surviving corpora-
tion.
232. McCarthy v. Osborn, 223 La. 305, 311, 65 So.2d 776, 778-79 (1953).
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ters to include the provisions of the prior statute23 3 dealing with
mergers, and the two corporations then effected "an agreement
to merge." Mrs. McCarthy successfully attacked that effort to
circumvent the buy and sell agreement.
There is also an interesting provision in the new act permit-
ting a foreign corporation to become a Louisiana corporation,
and vice versa, without the necessity of first organizing a new
corporation and merging into it, provided the laws of the other
state authorize such a change. 23 4 This is believed to be a provision
unique to Louisiana but if other states adopt a similar provision
it could be very helpful.
PART XII
Transfer of Corporate Assets
A voluntary sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all
or substantially all the assets of a corporation requires stock-
holder approval by a vote of two-thirds of those present at the
meeting-or such lesser number (not less than a majority) as
the articles may provide.235 It is considered that this does not ap-
ply to a mortgage or pledge.23 6
Dissenters' rights to be paid the fair market value of their
shares exist unless the transfer of assets has been approved by a
vote of eighty percent of the total voting power.2 3 7
Although there is no Louisiana jurisprudence on the point, it
is believed that stockholder approval would not be necessary for
a mortgage or pledge of all or substantially all the assets, under
either our former statute or the new act; and the basic reasoning
is that generally a sale of all assets means the corporation is go-
ing out of business whereas a mortgage of all assets without de-
lay may be necessary for it to continue in business.
At common law, a board could mortgage all assets without
stockholder approval. 231 Prior to its 1962 revision, the Model
Act,23 9 however, required shareholder approval for the mortgage
233. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 47, 48.
234. LA. R.S. 12:164 (Supp. 1968).
235. Id. § 121.
236. See comment to id. § 121. Further, § 131A, speaking of rights of minority
stockholders dissenting with respect to certain corporate actions to be paid the
fair cash value of their shares, provided they follow the procedure set forth in
§ 131, refers to a "sale, lease or exchange of all its assets."
237. LA. R.S. 12:131A (Supp. 1968). Through oversight, a legislative com-
mittee amendment to § 131A was not incorporated in § 121B, nor in § 112C, but
the legislative intent is clear.
238. 2 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 516 (rev. ed. 1954).
239. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 71 & 72 (1960).
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or pledge of all or substantially all assets if not in the usual and
regular course of its business. But the 1962 revision of the Model
Act 24° provides expressly that the board alone (in the absence of
contrary charter or by-law provisions, of course) has the author-
ity to mortgage or pledge all or substantially all assets whether
in or outside the usual and regular course of business. New York
at first was not in accord with this revision but now is-as are
most modern statutes.241
PART XIII
Dissenting Shareholders' Rights
The new statute limits the corporate actions which are sub-
ject to dissenters' rights. Dissenting shareholders' appraisal
rights are now limited to mergers and consolidations, and to a
sale, lease or exchange of all or substantially all of its assets.
Such rights no longer exist with respect to an amendment of
the articles of incorporation which materially changes the cor-
porate purposes, or which changes the rights of the holders of
any outstanding shares.24 2 Except as to the dissenting share-
holders of a subsidiary merging with a controlling parent cor-
poration,'24 3 dissenters' rights come into existence only if the
action has not been approved by at least eighty percent of the
total voting power.24 4 This is the same vote required under the
prior statute to eliminate dissenter's rights, although as first
drafted by the committee approval of the particular action by a
two-thirds vote of the total voting power would have eliminated
dissenters' rights.24
5
Under the new statute, the right to dissent does not apply in
the following situations :246
(1) A sale pursuant to an order of court having jurisdiction
in the premises;
(2) A sale for cash on terms requiring distribution of all or
substantially all of the net proceeds to the shareholders
240. Id. § 71, 72 (Pocket Part 1966).
241. Id.
242. LA. R.S. 12:131 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 52. See LA.
R.S. 12:31C (Supp. 1968) for requirements relative to an amendment affecting
rights of holders of outstanding shares.
243. Who can demand they be paid the fair cash value of their shares irre-
spective of the size vote in favor of the merger if they themselves voted against the
action.
244. LA. R.S. 12:131A (Supp. 1968).
245. See pages 481-86 supra.
246. LA. R.S. 12:131B (Supp. 1968).
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in accordance with their respective interests within one
year after the date of the sale;
(3) Mergers or consolidation by corporations (a) listed on a
national securities exchange or (b) whose shares are
held of record by at least 2,000 stockholders, unless the
articles of the corporation issuing such stock provide
otherwise or the shares were not converted solely into
shares of the surviving or new corporation.
Under the prior statute, the dissenters' right arose merely by
virtue of his not having voted in favor of the action taken at the
shareholders' meeting and he could object to the action taken
within twenty days after the voting.247 Under the new statute, a
dissenting shareholder to exercise his rights must have actually
voted against the corporate action involved and must have filed
a written objection to the proposed corporate action prior to or
at the meeting; and within twenty days of notice from the cor-
poration that less than eighty percent had approved the action,
made written demand to be paid.2 48
The procedure prescribed for a dissenting shareholder has
been more clearly set forth in the new statute.249 Those entitled
to "dissenters' rights" who follow the required procedure to de-
mand them, are entitled to be paid the fair cash value of their
shares as of the day before the vote on which he had dissented.
If the shareholder and the corporation do not agree on what is
the fair cash value, the dissenter may sue but the action to which
he dissented is not stayed.2 50
PART XIV
Dissolution
If the corporation is a going concern, unless there is unani-
mous shareholder consent,2 51 the Model Act and most statutes re-
quire the board of directors first vote to dissolve and then have
approval of two-thirds of all isued stock.252 But neither the prior
Louisiana statute nor the new act requires board action first.2 53
And only the common or voting stock votes unless the articles
give the vote on this question to other classes of stock.2 54 Further-
247. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 52A.
248. LA. R.S. 12:131A, 131C (Supp. 1968).
249. Id. § 131.
250. Id. § 131E.
251. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 76 (1960).
252. Id. § 77.
253. LA. R.S. 12:142 (Supp. 1968). Accord, La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 54.
254. LA. R.S. 12:142A (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 54A.
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more, under the prior statute approval by two-thirds of the total
voting power was required for a voluntary dissolution; but under
the new statute approval by only two-thirds of the voting power
present at the meeting is required. 255
The new statute provides that if no shares in fact have been
issued the incorporators themselves may dissolve the corporation
by unanimous action of the incorporators and apparently this
power continues until shares have been issued. 2, 6 Under this new
statute corporate existence can begin before any shares are in
fact issued; and such a corporation can in fact begin the transac-
tion of ordinary business and incur debts, without there being
any paid in capital unless the articles state there is to be a paid-
in capital-for only if so stated is there a requirement of paid-in
capital before transacting ordinary business.2 5 7 Hence it would
appear that a going business corporation which has incurred
debts but has no shareholders or capital can be dissolved volun-
tarily merely by unanimous action of the incorporators; but a
court would then most probably hold the incorporators personal-
ly liable.
The provision permitting incorporators to dissolve is taken
from the Model Act; but it provides that if the corporation does
not commence business and issue shares, a majority of the incor-
porators may dissolve-but only during the first two years of its
organization. 28 Some statutes expressly state that "good faith"
on the part of those seeking a voluntary dissolution, or some ben-
efit to the stockholders, is a prerequisite for a voluntary disso-
lution by less than unanimous action. 259 Neither the prior statute,
nor the new one, mentions "good faith" as a prerequisite,2 10 but
the Louisiana jurisprudence seems in accord with the general
rule that the court will not permit a voluntary dissolution by
those in bad faith towards the minority.2 6 1
The new statute also makes other changes with respect to dis-
solution. The prior one expressly permitted the court to order an
involuntary dissolution if the corporation was insolvent in the
255. LA. R. S. 12:142A (Supp. 1968). This is in accord with the Model Act;
2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 75 (1960) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 54A.
256. LA. R.S, 12:142A (Supp. 1968).
257. Id. 12:26.
258. Id. §§ 12:26, 12:142A.
259. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 75 (1960).
260. LA. R.S. 12:142 (Supp. 1968) ; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 54.
261. Termini v. McCormick, 208 La. 221, 23 So.2d 52 (1945) ; Pringle v. El-
tringham Constr. Co., 49 La. Ann. 301, 21 So. 515 (1897) ; Funderbuck v. Mag-
nolia Sugar Co-op., 8 So.2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942).
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bankruptcy sense.2 62 The new act omits this particular ground,
although there is a provision2 63 for involuntary dissolution on the
petition of a creditor whose claim has been reduced to judgment
on which execution has been issued and returned "nulla bona,"
and also in instances where a receiver has been appointed.
The prior statute had a provision expressly making it discre-
tionary with the court to order an involuntary dissolution if the
court found it to be "beneficial" to the interest of the sharehold-
ers that the corporation should be liquidated and dissolved.2 64 It
also had a provision for discretionary involuntary dissolution in
the event of deadlock of directors or shareholders,2 65 but this
broad general power above referred to would seem to have itself
permitted dissolution in the event of deadlock. Nonetheless, the
new statute not only retains the enumeration of additional ex-
press grounds for voluntary dissolution but clarifies and perhaps
expands the provisions in the event of this deadlock; and also
adds the appointment of a receiver as an express ground for
dissolution.266
Some statutes dealing with the "deadlock" situation expressly
permit the involuntary dissolution on this ground regardless of
motives and even though the corporation is a profitable one. Un-
der the new Louisiana statute: (1) if the shareholders are dead-
locked in voting power for at least two consecutive annual meet-
ings, and have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms
would normally have expired, that very fact-regardless of mo-
tive or effect on the corporation-would seem to be an "absolute"
ground for involuntary dissolution ;267 or (2) a deadlock on the
board which the shareholders "are unable to break" is a ground
for seeking involuntary dissolution.26 As originally drafted by
the committee, a deadlock on the board would have been a ground
for involuntary dissolution only if "irreparable injury to the cor-
poration is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof ;"
but the quoted language was deleted from the bill before it was
filed and that drafting "history" might persuade a court that
this ground too is an "absolute" ground.
Both "deadlock" provisions come from the Model Act.2 69 Ore-
262. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 55A(1).
263. LA. R.S. 12:143B(3) (Supp. 1968).
264. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 55A(3).
265. Id. 55a (4).
266. LA. R.S. 12:143A(4), (5), (9) (Supp. 1968).
267. Id. § 143A(5).
268. Id. 143A(4).
269. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 90(a) (1), (3) (1960).
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gon has the same provisions, but in 1959 an Oregon court"' re-
fused to appoint a liquidating receiver despite a deadlock and the
inability for three years to elect successors to the board. The ba-
sis of the decision was that the old board was still functioning
and the corporation was solvent though deadlocked. This is the
minority rule, however,71 and it is believed that the new Louisi-
ana statute follows the majority rule that deadlock is an absolute
ground.
As has been pointed out, the new statute expressly permits
corporations to enter into joint venture; and if one of those cor-
porations has but two shareholders, each of which owns half the
shares, then either may cause such a joint venture to be ter-
minated .2 72
It has already been pointed out that the new Louisiana statute
adds as an express ground for discretionary voluntary dissolu-
tion instances where a receiver has been appointed. The converse
is also covered in the new statute,273 permitting the court to shift
a dissolution into a receivership.
Statutes of most other states, and the Model Act 2 7 4 would
preserve the corporate life of a corporation in process of disso-
lution, so as to enable the liquidators to fully complete the liqui-
dation. Louisiana's prior statute 7 5 was not entirely clear on this
point, nor was the jurisprudence.276 The new statute spells out
fully and clearly the status of the corporation being dissolved and
the duty and powers of the liquidators. 2 77
The new statute also clears up the ageless problem of what to
do with distributive shares of shareholders who could not be
found, for it expressly states the liquidator should deliver these
funds or assets to the Collector of Revenue.2 78 Previously the
liquidator was often uncertain what to do with these unclaimed
distributions-particularly as to Orleans Parish where any un-
claimed funds were supposed to be delivered to the Public Ad-
ministrator.279
270. Jackson v. Nicholai-Neppach Co., 348 P.2d 9 (Ore. 1959).
271. Israels, Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 778 (1952).
272. LA. R.S. 12:143C (Supp. 1968).
273. Id. § 143E.
274. 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 79 (1960).
275. Cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 57, 61, 62.
276. Cf. Munn v. Wadley, 192 La. 874, 189 So. 561 (1939) ; Brown & Son
v. Wholesalers, Inc. in Liquidation 52 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; LA.
CODE CIV. P. art. 692.
277. LA. R.S. 12:141-149 (Supp. 1968).
278. Id. § 145.
279. Id. 9:1585.
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The new statute expressly provides a method and procedure
whereby liquidators, by notice of at least six months, can pre-
empt against claims even by persons under legal disability2 80
the latter to have their only recourse against their tutors and
curators.
The new statute covers the troublesome situation of there be-
ing a need, following final dissolution, to revive the corporation
(to handle inadvertently omitted assets by way of example), and
the former liquidator is dead. In addition to retaining281 the pro-
vision in the former statute that inadvertently omitted property
would vest in the original liquidator despite a "final certificate
of dissolution," the new statute expressly provides :282
"E. Following cessation of the corporate existence, the liqui-
dator shall still have power to take all action required to
preserve the interests of the corporation, its creditors
and shareholders; and the court shall have power, on ap-
plication by any interested party, to appoint, ex parte or
on such notice as the court may order, a new liquidator
for any proper purpose in case of the death, disability or
unwillingness to serve of the last previous liquidator."
The new statute also provides that the court may dismiss a
proceeding for dissolution which is under its supervision, at any
time before the corporate existence has ceased (1) upon a show-
ing that a cause for dissolution no longer exists, or (2) upon
motion of those who instituted the proceeding.28 3
The court "may" dismiss a voluntary dissolution upon the
same affirmative vote of whatever number of the shareholders
as was required to have begun it 2 84-and this would be two-thirds
the voting power present unless the articles required a greater
vote.2 2 Under the prior statute28 6 the vote required to dismiss a
pending voluntary dissolution was five-sixths of all of each class
of shareholders.
Under the new statutes dissolution is effective retroactive to
the date of the filing of the liquidator's certificate, notwith-
280. Id. 12:147.
281. Id. § 148D.
282. Id. § 148E.
283. Id. § 149.
284. Id. §149B.
285. Id. § 142.
286. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 62D(2).
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standing there may be a delay in obtaining the customary clear-
ances from the Revenue and Labor Departments.28
Liquidators in either a voluntary or involuntary liquidation2 88
are expressly prohibited from having an inventory of the cor-
poration's assets "made by a notary public"-reflecting aware-
ness of the abuse which had been prevalent in certain areas and
which is also reflected in the Code of Civil Procedure.2 89
The new statute, as did the prior one, contemplates a termi-
nation of the liquidation once all debts and liabilities have been
paid, including all costs and expenses of the liquidation, with the
liquidator turning over to the shareholders any net assets re-
maining,290 and thereupon dissolving the corporation.2 91 There
may well have been, however, a desire by a majority of the share-
holders to continue the corporate existence for the purpose of ad-
ministering intact all or part of such remaining net assets for
the benefit of the shareholders; and this might well be more
beneficial to the shareholders than a distribution of assets to
them. The 1968 legislature made just such a provision with re-
spect to the liquidation of banks by adding to the applicable
banking statute a provision2 9 2 that after the Banking Commis-
sioner (liquidator) had paid all debts and liability, including
costs and expenses of the liquidation and had called a meeting of
shareholders to deliver to them the net remaining assets, then:
"B. At the meeting called by the commissioner the share-
holders by majority vote of those present or represented
may elect to retain some or all of the assets in lieu of a
liquidation thereof, and upon election by the shareholders
to retain any of the assets, the corporate existence shall
continue solely for the purpose of administering the as-
sets for the benefit of the shareholders."
A similar result, of continuing corporate existence beyond
payment of all debts and liabilities, including costs and expenses
of the liquidation, would appear possible with respect to other
corporations under the provisions of the new statute permitting
termination of proceedings for dissolution at any time before the
corporate existence has ceased. 2
9
287. LA. R.S. 12:148B, 148C (Supp. 1968).
288. Id. §145C, 145D.
289. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3136.
290. LA. R.S. 12:145F (Supp. 1968); cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, Title 12,
ch. 9.
291. Id. § 148; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, tit. 12, ch. 9.
292. LA. R.S. 6:395 (Supp. 1968), as added by La. Acts 1968, No. 377, § 1.
293. LA. R.S. 12:149 (Supp. 1968).
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PART XV
Receivers
Under the new statute, to entitle appointment of a receiver
continuance of the corporation's business should be of great con-
cern to the public generally, or there should be a strong prospect
of returning control of it to the shareholders as a profitable and
going concern.2 9 4 Any other type of receivership as the term is
sometimes understood, is contemplated to be effective through
an involuntary dissolution under court supervision. The new
statute, however, does empower the court to shift a receivership
into involuntary dissolution or vice versa.29
5
If unsuccessful petitioners for a receivership are found to be
in bad faith, attorney's fees may be awarded against them.29 6
PART XVI
Other Proceedings
The only change with respect to compromise arrangements or
reorganizations of corporations which are in process of dissolu-
tion is that the new statute entitles any corporation to the bene-
fit of the section 297 unless the articles provide otherwise. This is
in line with the general policy of giving corporations broad pow-
ers and rights unless denied in the charter, instead of requiring
all the boiler plate provisions to be in the charter.
There is added, however, a new section2 98 to enable the trustees
in any reorganization ordered by the courts under any applica-
ble Act of Congress, to effectuate such a reorganization.
With respect to an action by the state to annul, vacate or for-
feit corporate franchise: Such a "right" of action is given the
Secretary of State in the new act rather than to the Attorney
294. LA. R.S. 12:143F, 151, 152 (Supp. 1968). This is in accord with prior ju-
risprudential rules. In Peiser v. Grand Isle, Inc., 221 La. 585, 60 So.2d 1 (1952),
the court said: "While the provisions [of the statute] set forth the causes for
which a receivership may be sought by a shareholder, the appointment of a re-
ceiver is not mandatory ,but is subject to sound judicial discretion. . . . In deter-
mining whether or not the facts justify and make advisable a receivership, in the
absence of a clear showing of fraud or breach of trust the courts are slow to inter-
fere, will order the appointment of a receiver only when it is manifest that it
should be made, and are influenced by a consideration of whether such action
would serve a useful purpose."
295. LA. R.S. 12:143F (Supp. 1968).
296. Id. § 151D.
297. Compare La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 63 with LA. R.S. 12:161 (Supp. 1968).
298. LA. R.S. 12:162 (Supp. 1968).
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General.299 What were four separately stated grounds °0 are now
embraced in one reading simply:301 "The corporation has con-
tinued to abuse authority conferred upon it." And the new statute
omits as a ground for suit to annul, the fact of a corporation
"being a party to an illegal combination in restraint of trade. '30 2
The philosophy behind this omission is that capital punishment
is too harsh a punishment-even for a corporation.
The new statute adds a new ground, however, for such a suit
to annul, vacate, or forfeit: failure to file a franchise tax return
or an annual report, for three consecutive years20
The new statute expressly makes an action to annul, vacate or
forfeit a charter a summary procedure; and, finally it makes
provision for a judgment of annulment or forfeiture to be set
aside if within the appeal period the "ground" is cured.304
PART XVII
General Provisions
Because of greater responsibility imposed on the Secretary of
State, the new statute provides for a modest increase in his
fees.3 0 5 More importantly, all penalty provisions are grouped in
one section of the new act-and these are made more realistic. 3 06
Finally, in this concluding Part Seventeen, existing corpora-
tions are given the benefit of this statute and are also protected
against it impairing any constitutionally protected right.30 7 But
the effort is made to be certain that in the future the hands of
the legislature are not tied in their regulation of existing cor-
porations; and to make it clear that the state can make its future
corporation statutes applicable to then existing corporations3 8-
to the extent the federal constitution would permit.
ACT 106 of 1968
Amending and Re-Enacting Sections 32C, 33, 135C, 161,
221B, 224A, 241 and 247, and Repealing Sections 137, 223C,
224D, and 249 of R.S. 47.
299. Id. § 163A; cf. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 65.
300. La. Corp. Act of 1928, §§ 65(2)-(5).
301. LA. R.S. 12:163A(2) (Supp. 1968).
302. La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 65A (7).
303. LA. R.S. 12:163A(5) (Supp. 1968).
304. Id. § 163C.
305. Id. § 171.
306. Id. § 172.
307. Id. § 173.
308. Id. § 177.
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This act was an integral part of the entire legislative effort
to so modernize Louisiana's corporation laws as to not only retain
the few remaining domestic corporations doing a multi-state
business but be able to compete with Delaware, New York, North
Carolina and the other states which have modernized their laws,
in persuading multi-state business corporations to become Lou-
isiana corporations.
This Act 106 of 1968 amends the Income Tax statute so as to
eliminate the discrimination which was in the Louisiana income
tax law against Louisiana corporations in favor of foreign cor-
porations. Foreign corporations were taxed by Louisiana only on
income allocable to Louisiana. But Louisiana corporations were
taxed on the entirely of their income, with a credit for income
taxes paid to other states. But in the case of income earned in
Texas or in some other state having no income tax, a Louisiana
corporation formerly paid a full tax to Louisiana on this Texas
income, whereas a Delaware corporation doing business in Lou-
isiana paid no income tax on that Texas income to either Texas
or Delaware. By this new statute the Louisiana income tax on all
corporations-domestic as well as foreign-is now imposed only
on income earned in Louisiana.
Further, the imposition of a Louisiana income tax on a do-
mestic corporation on upstream dividends received from its for-
eign subsidiaries on their earnings outside Louisiana is believed
to have been eliminated by this Act 106 of 1968.
A domestic parent corporation was previously exempted from
an income tax on dividends received from its subsidiaries if the
income of those subsidiaries had been taxed to them by Louisi-
ana.3 0 9 For example, a parent Louisiana finance company with
subsidiary finance companies in, say, five Louisiana cities, would
not have been taxed by Louisiana on dividends it received from
these Louisiana subsidiaries. This section remains unchanged.
But if that same parent Louisiana finance company had as its
five subsidiaries, Mississippi corporations which earned their in-
come from and in Mississippi, Louisiana would nonetheless have
heretofore taxed that Louisiana parent on all dividends it re-
ceived from those Mississippi subsidiaries.310
R.S. 47:161 and 241 were significantly amended by Louisiana
309. An allowable deduction under LA. R.S. 47:63 (1950).
310. Id. under La. Corp. Act of 1928, § 161A; under LA. R.S. 47:63 (1950),
the deduction not being applicable.
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Acts of 1968, No. 106, § 5, as best illustrated by their text before
and after the amendment:
"§ 161. Income from sources partly within and partly without
the State of Louisiana
"A. Resident individuals, a-c m .... c ..... In
the case of a resident individual ^- o...-" ......i'n
items of gross income, expenses, losses, and deductions, from
whatever source received or incurred, not otherwise exempted
by this Chapter, shall be included in the taxpayer's return
and the amount of the tax shall be computed upon the entire
income from whatever source derived; ....
"B. Nonresident individuals, a ifo"g.........
In the case of a nonresident individual cr f.ri corpora-
tion, items of gross income, expenses, losses and deductions,
from whatever source received or incurred, not otherwise
exempted by this Chapter, shall be included in the taxpayer's
return; but, for the purpose of this Chapter, the amount of
tax shall be computed only upon the net income earned within
or derived from sources within this state, such net income
to be computed as provided in Sub-part F of Part II of this
Chapter."
Section 243 (4) of Title 47, which remains unchanged, would
appear to make certain the deduction or exemption, for it pro-
vides in part:
"... [p] rovided that dividends upon stock having a situs in
Louisiana received by a corporation from another corporation
which is controlled by the former, through ownership of 50 %
or more of the voting stock of the latter, shall be allocated
to the state or states in which is earned the income from
which the dividends are paid, such allocation to be made in
proportion to the respective amounts of such income earned in
each state ...."
Heretofore if a Louisiana Corporation wished to reincorpo-
rate elsewhere and make an exchange intended to be free of
Louisiana income tax consequences,311 the Louisiana corpora-
tion had to first establish "to the satisfaction of the (Louisiana)
Collector that such exchange is not in pursuance of a plan having
311. LA. R.S. 47:1330, D, E, F, and H.
[Vol. XXIX
1969] BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 497
as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Louisiana in-
come taxes.' '312 This is no longer required, as this section was
repealed.3 1 3
To prevent or lessen any loss in revenues resulting from
these various changes, the act reduced the corporate income tax
exemption very slightly-from $3000 to $2000. 314
312. Id. 47:137.
313. La. Acts 1968, No. 106, § 10.
314. Id. § 2, amending LA. R.S. 12:32C (Supp. 1968).
